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The purpose of  the present study was  to design and validate 
a written instrument which would approximate  the Kohlberg   (1958) 
Moral Judgment   Interview in yielded scores.     Validity of the  instru- 
ment was determined by whether it yielded age differences in moral 
stage scores.     Kohlberg found age differences  and he later postulated 
a relationship between moral stages and cognitive stages which pre- 
dicts age differences. 
The subjects were a non-random sampling of 57  seventh-grade 
students,   61 twelfth-grade students,   and 50 college students. 
The data were collected,  using  two comparable written instru- 
ments,  one of which was an open-end questionnaire requiring self- 
structured  responses;   the other was an objective multiple-choice 
instrument. 
Analyses  of score differences within groups and between groups 
were done by the  statistical procedures of analysis of variance and 
t>test  for significance of the differences. 
The open-end Instrument discriminated  the  scores of seventh- 
graders  and  twelfth-graders, whereas  the objective instrument did 
not discriminate  among  the three different groups at  all. 
ADAPTATION OF A MORAL  JUDGMENT 
INTERVIEW FOR A  PEN 
AND  PAPER  TEST 
by 
Madge Twiggs Schwarz 
A Thesis Submitted   to 
the Faculty of the Graduate  School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements  for the Degree 
Master of Science in Home Economics 
Greensboro 
1974 
Approved  by 
(H^ij^e^J 7)1. A&gL 
Thesis Adviser 
APPROVAL  PAGE 
This thesis has been approved by the  following comraitte of 
the Faculty of the Graduate School at  the University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro. 
Thesis Adviser U^Me^U' fr 9&AtuX.) 
Committee Members 
\. QjM^   -y^fcfc, ib~ 
* 
Date^f Acceptance by Committee 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The researcher wishes  to acknowledge several  individuals 
whose efforts were  helpful in designing and completing  the present 
study. 
An especial appreciation is expressed   to Dr.   Rebecca Smith, 
Associate Professor of Child Development  and Family Relations,   thesis 
adviser and  committee chairman,   for her   invaluable  judgment,   encourage- 
ment,   and guidance. 
Grateful acknowledgment  is also extended   to Dr.  James Watson, 
Chairman,   Child Development and Family Relations,   and Dr.   Robin Pratt, 
Assistant  Professor of Psychology,   committee members,   for their  support 
and helpful criticism. 
A particular expression of  thanks  is extended  to Dr.   Carl 
Cochrane  for his  inestimable help  in analyzing  the data,  and   to 
Jean Scott   for  her  time and   skill  in scoring  the data. 
Finally,   to John,  a  sincere expression of gratitude is ex- 
tended   for his patience and  encouraging support  throughout  the 
study. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  ill 
LIST OF  TABLES  v 
CHAPTER 
I.      INTRODUCTION  1 
Purpose of  the Study  7 
II.     REVIEW OF THE  LITERATURE  8 
Moral Development in Historical Perspective.   .   . 8 
Piaget's Cognitive Stages and Moral Development. 15 
Kohlberg's Moral Development Theory  24 
Newest Developments by Kohlberg  39 
Research Emanating from Kohlberg's Theory.   ... 42 
Moral Education  52 
Conclusions and Suggestions  for Research .... 55 
III.     PROCEDURE  58 
Scoring  the Research   Instruments    64 
IV.     FINDINGS AND  DISCUSSION  74 
Reliability of Scoring Open-End   Instrument  ... 75 
Validation of the Open-End   Instrument  75 
Validation of the Objective   Instrument    82 
V.     SUMMARY,   CONCLUSIONS, AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  88 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  91 
APPENDIX:     THE  RESEARCH   INSTRUMENTS    94 
Open-End   Instrument  94 
Objective   Instrument  98 
iv 
481346 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE Page 
1. Analysis of  the Variance and t^-tests of Dominant 
Stages on the Open-End Test  for  Seventh-Grade, 
Twelfth-Grade,   and  College Students  76 
2. Comparison of Frequency Distributions and  Per- 
centages of Dominant Stages  from Open-End 
Instruments of Blatt,  Rest,   and  the Present 
Study  79 
3. Analysis of  the Variance and Mean Stage Scores 
on the Objective   Instrument  for Seventh Grade, 
Twelfth Grade,   and College Subjects   82 
4. Frequency Distributions and  Percentages of 
Dominant Stages on Objective   Instrument   83 
5.    Distribution of Difference Scores between the 
Highest Stage Reached Twice on the Open- 
End   Instrument  and  the Dominant Stage Reached 
on the Objective  Instrument by College Students 85 
CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
Through   the years,  morality has been an oft-discussed   topic, 
with historical  figures advocating their particular morality,   in 
keeping with  the  chronological  times and  the needs of society. 
Thus, morality,  or   the relevant  code of acceptable social behavior, 
is a function of  society and   cannot be defined  except  in the con- 
text of the  social  system it  is designed  to uphold and  represent. 
It  is a way of controlling any society through perpetuation of that 
society's adopted value  system,   by way of written or unwritten cus- 
toms,  norms,   laws,   or mores.     The Ten Commandments is an example of 
such a behavioral  code,  designed  to preserve and  control one specific 
society at a  specific  time  in world history. 
Traditionally,   the  terms "morality," "moral  character,"  and 
"moral development" have been used  synonymously to describe  the 
process whereby children are thought to grow into "moral," "socialized" 
and responsible members of adult  society.     The interpretation of moral- 
ity,   in general,   has often been left to the philosopher or  the religious 
leader,   the courts and  the   legal  system,  or to the community and  the 
social  system.     The manifestation of morality has been considered, at 
different   times,   to be specific behavioral acts,  associated with 
characteristic virtues   (Hartshorne & May,   1928)  or individual person- 
ality "types"   (Havighurst & Taba,   1949);   or it has been designated 
as non-specific behaviors associated with theoretical and  intangible 
ideals or standards   (Durkheim,   1961). 
For the duration of the present paper, the following definition 
of morality will be relevant: 
Morality is a character trait which is generally believed 
to enable one to classify behaviors or situations as "right" 
or "wrong," rather than conscientiously to judge them. 
Morality, in the sense of being an absolutist doctrine, is 
to be distinguished from culturally-relative "moral values," 
which are determined by cultural consensus only and embody 
no universal principles.  "Morality" and the concept of 
"moral values" are often used as synonyms for "moral develop- 
ment"; however, they are erroneous synonyms because the 
former two terms refer to products of socialization, social 
learning, and conditioning, and are not developmental in 
nature (Kohlberg, 1971). 
Conventional morality is distinctly different from the post- 
conventional or autonomous nature inherent in "moral development," 
a term which implies individual, internal, and natural development 
of moral thinking, rather than internalization of existing, sanctioned 
codes of behavior. 
The following definition of moral development will be adhered 
to in the present study: 
Moral development involves a continual process of matching 
a moral view to one's experience of life in a social world. 
Experiences of conflict in this process generate movement 
from structural stage to structural stage (Kohlberg, 1969, 
p. 119). 
Each invariant, sequential stage is defined by its constituent atti- 
tudinal factors which serve as criteria for morally judging situa- 
tions and behaviors.  The six moral development stages, as discerned 
and labeled by Kohlberg, are more generally classified as constituent 
pairs belonging to sequential, invariant levels of moral development. 
One's moral development is assessed in terms of one's own moral think- 
ing which is, in turn, characteristic of one of the six stages. 
Moral reasoning is thought to be developmental and invariant. 
Although functioning at a specific cognitive level is a prerequisite 
for attainment of the corresponding moral level, true structural 
advancement in moral reasoning begins with stimulation of the given 
cognitive state by external situations requiring more adequate moral 
judgments.  Therefore, moral development does not automatically 
accompany cognitive development; it is a natural, universal process 
with a fundamental cognitive basis.  Neither "morality" nor "morals" 
adequately expresses this definition of moral reasoning. 
One of the most recent and thorough approaches to moral 
development is Kohlberg's theory of moral developmental stages, 
which is based largely upon Piaget's theory of cognitive development. 
Kohlberg contends that neither totally inherent nor totally learned 
factors determine moral thinking.  Rather, the interaction of cogni- 
tive functions with social stimuli results in a  mental structure 
which predicts the adequacy of moral thought. As one matures mentally, 
he experiences social conflict, which stimulates moral thinking by 
challenging existing patterns of decision-making. Advancement in 
moral development parallels cognitive development, given sufficiently 
challenging social conditions, and it occurs in stages which are in- 
variant and sequential. Kohlberg's approach, therefore, is centered 
about a hierarchy of moral stages, each of which is more integrated and 
more differentiated than the previous stage.  The thinking representa- 
tive of each stage, consequently, is progressively more sophisticated. 
The two highest moral stages are oriented to the purest forms of the 
ethical principles of equality, reciprocity, and justice. 
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The philosophical adequacy of Kohlberg's approach  is founded 
on the universal nature of the moral principles  it encompasses. 
Cross-cultural studies have shown that  the same basic moral values 
and  the same steps  toward moral maturity are  found  in every culture 
and  subculture of  the world   (Kohlberg,   1969;  Kohlberg & Turiel,   1971; 
Kohlberg & Gilligan,   1973).     Consequently,   this developmental approach 
is,  above all others,  valid even in the face of cultural relativism. 
It is oriented  to those basic human rights which underlie all moral 
systems.     These universally valid   ideals,   all of which are  forms of 
justice,   represent an undercurrent of moral  thought,  which  is much 
deeper  than a  set of rules or regulations designed   to ensure or pro- 
hibit specific acts of behavior.     These rights are recognized  in all 
cultures,  and are upheld  to differing degrees,  by most  cultural mores 
and  laws.     Cultural relativity predicts  that some  laws may be dis- 
torted by prejudice,   ignorance, or superstition,   or they may be 
manipulated  to protect or serve an elite sect.     However,  although 
the essential nature of   these basic rights may be distorted,   the 
principles themselves are timeless  ideals and represent  that which 
"ought"  to be  in every culture  (Kohlberg,   1971). 
The days of slavery  in the United States exemplify a period 
in time when the  law designed  to ensure one of several universal 
rights,   the equality of all men,  as stated  in the  United States 
Constitution,  was subverted   to ensure  the equality of a select group 
of men; white men.    Abraham Lincoln,   long recognized as a philosopher 
in his own right,  was a principled  thinker who saw the hypocrisy inher- 
ent in conditional equality.     By Martin Luther King's time,   the laws 
had been modified  so as   to give more strength  to the American ideal of 
equality,  but many were  still conspicuously designed   to serve the 
Caucasian race.     Today,   another debasement of the equalitarian 
principle is  coming  to the  front;   the current  issue  in the United 
States is  that of sexual  inequality, which,   like racial  inequality, 
slurs, distorts,  and makes a farce of a basic human right. 
Belief  in the  ideals of equality,  reciprocity,   the dignity of 
human life,  and   justice has been perpetuated over  time because such 
principles are inherently valuable and morally right,   in and of them- 
selves.     Therefore,   their validity, derived  from the  inherently moral 
order of the universe,   is  independent of social endorsement. 
Recognition of  the  universality of principled moral stages 
and  the need  for a moral education program that  is not merely in- 
doctrination of conventional behavioral codes,   has prompted Kohlberg 
in recent years  to focus his research on a practical method of moral 
education.     Kohlberg and Turiel   (1971)  have become strong advocates 
of a moral  education program designed  to stimulate the school child's 
moral  thinking  in much the same way that guided   learning techniques 
(Ojemann & Pritchett,   1966) have been designed  to stimulate cognitive 
growth.     However,  putting this program to work offers a great challenge 
to teachers,   since  they must be prepared  to discern and   label moral 
development  stages of  their  students.     Kohlberg claims  that stimulation 
of growth and progression to the next natural  stage, which can be the 
only true objective of moral education,   cannot begin until one s cur- 
rent  functioning moral stage  is determined.     It  is at  this point  that 
stimulation is directed,   so as to create conflict,  and hence,  a recogni- 
tion of the moral  inadequacy of the current  stage. 
Kohlberg has developed an oral Interviewing process which re- 
veals age differences in functioning stages of moral thinking;   it re- 
quires a great deal of  time and  can be given to only one person at a 
time.     Although  this process allows  for much flexibility and probing, 
by the  interviewer,  of underlying  thought  structures,   it  is time- 
consuming and constitutes a  laborious task for  the average teacher. 
The  justification for  this study lies in the assumption that 
moral education of children is a valid educational goal and  in the 
need  for  teacher materials  to realize this goal.    A convenient in- 
strument, possibly a structured,   objective  instrument,   for ascer- 
taining  the moral development  level of a group of people simul- 
taneously that would closely approximate Kohlberg's own interview 
form may be a valid  contribution to  the study of moral development 
and  to the application of resulting research findings.    Moral educa- 
tors may be aided  in the task of  implementing a valid  educational 
program which perhaps otherwise would be impeded by the unnecessary 
barriers of  the individual,   time-consuming   interviews. 
It  is expected  that a valid  instrument would reveal age dif- 
ferences  in moral  stage scores for  two reasons:     (a) Kohlberg found 
age differences   (1958;   1963)  and   (b)   the relation of moral  stages to 
cognitive stages predicts age differences,   since cognitive stages 
have been defined  as age-related   (Piaget,   1932; Ginsburg & Opper,   1969; 
Kohlberg & Gilligan,   1973). 
Thus, the operable research question for the present study is 
this: Can the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview be adapted to a pen 
and paper instrument which will yield scores comparable to interview 
scores,  showing age differences  in moral development? 
Purpose of  the Study 
The purpose of  the present  study was  to design and validate a 
written instrument which yields  scores and  age differences comparable 
to those found with  the Kohlberg Moral Judgment   Interview.     The  study 
was limited   to a comparison of  two written  instruments over  three age- 
groups. 
CHAPTER  II 
REVIEW OF  THE  LITERATURE 
The  literature review will  include an account of early work 
done in the   field  of moral thinking and behavior;   a detailed pre- 
sentation of Piaget's theory of cognitive and moral development;   an 
in-depth  look at Kohlberg's moral philosophy and moral-stage theory, 
followed by a comparison of his  theory with Piaget's;   empirical evi- 
dence  supporting Kohlberg's approach;   and current research in moral 
development,   including Kohlberg's work in and his philosophy of 
moral education. 
Moral Development   in Historical  Perspective 
During  the mid-nineteenth century,   before the area of morality 
and moral  thinking was thought to be researchable,  Emile Durkheim,  a 
foremost French philosopher,   advanced  a view of morality and   its 
place and   function in society,  which  today is recognized  as valid and 
insightful   (1961).     Durkheim purported a secular morality,   based  on 
a system of shared  conceptions of the common good.     This approach, 
encompassing a broader  ideal than mere  conformity to  traditional 
standards,   is dedicated  to the preservation of society itself,  and 
to the  subordination of  individual will  to the needs and goals of the 
collective mass.    Although  this view necessarily defines morality as 
being relative  to the specific social  structure which nurtures it, 
differing through  time and space according to  the parenting  social 
system, Durkheim contended that a complete and pure morality is 
characterized by consistency,   or a regularity of conduct, which is, 
in turn,  constrained  by some  sense of authority or generality;   the 
belief that what  is  right today Is,   and   should be right  tomorrow. 
Morality,   according to Durkheim,   is "a social thing,  being 
supra-individual,   endowed with a kind  of  transcendent  ideal   (p. xx)," 
and  is based  on the assumption that  society,   itself "has an  indepen- 
dent reality and existence which .   .   .  retains its  identity despite 
the endless changes  that are produced  in the mass of individual per- 
sonalities   (p.   xxii)."     This morality, with  the social and the moral 
intertwined,   is  the one to which all  are obligated.     It is founded  on 
reason,   rather  than revelation.     Sanctioned by a rationality of broader 
validity than the mere coercion of the conventional,   if not of the 
supernatural,   it  is a morality of post-conventional principles of 
common welfare.    Abstract and  idealistic,  Durkheim's philosophy is 
recognized  today by Piaget   (1932) and others  (Kohlberg & Turiel,   1971) 
as representing  those democratic principles upon which United  States 
society is founded. 
As  interest grew in sociology,   social psychologists began to 
view "moralization,"   or the act  of becoming moral,   evidenced by 
acceptance of and  conformity to  standard behavioral codes,  as a key 
process to understanding and controlling human behavior.     Thus,   the 
focus of  the  first  research attempts was on the manifestation of morality: 
moral behavior,  moral "character," and moral "virtues." 
The  late  1920's produced  a now-phenomenal study in moral  character 
and behavior,   completed by two giants in the field of moral research. 
Hartshorne and May   (1928)     collaborated   in testing hundreds of children 
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in several school  and   three home situations,   each of which was designed 
to provide opportunities  for cheating on test-performance.    Deception 
was repeatedly shown to be situation-specific.     It was found that cheat- 
ing on one test did not predict cheating on other tests;   cheating be- 
havior was shown to be dependent,   to a considerable extent, on the 
nature of the  test,  and on the extent of effort required to cheat 
successfully.     For  example, more cheating was found on tests requiring 
only the addition of a checkmark to change an answer,   than on tests   re- 
quiring the addition or erasure of words or sentences to change an 
answer. 
In the home  situations  (take-home tests)  girls cheated more 
than boys,  but no  factor,   including sex,  brightness,  and rank in 
class,  was  found  to influence cheating behavior  so profoundly as 
did  the  test  itself. 
However,   from recorded observations of individual behavior, 
it appeared that  individual  fortitude was influential in the strength 
of the tendency to cheat.     The researchers proposed   that people 
possess varying  levels of fortitude which facilitate cheating to 
different degrees,   in different situations. 
The tendency to [ cheat]   .   .   .   exists  in a measurable quantity 
peculiar to the  individual.    Whatever the motives,   they oper- 
ate to overcome  just so much resistance and no more;   this re- 
sistance can be arranged   to begin with  just no resistance at 
all and move up by measured  steps to the point where no one 
will overcome it  in order to cheat  (Hartshorne    &    May,  p.  387). 
Resistance was also thought  to be cumulative, with cheating 
behavior being proportional  to  the  level of resistance accumulated. 
"Those who overcome the greatest resistance in order to cheat will 
overcome also all weaker resistances  .   .   .   (Hartshorne    &    May, p.   389)." 
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By manipulating such factors as peer pressure,   group values, 
punishment, and reward,  as well as the test  itself, Hartshorne and May 
found  that honest behavior was determined more by situational  factors 
than by internal conscience or character  traits.     Motives of deception, 
however, were attributed,   in many cases,   to personality traits as 
diverse as  revengefulness,   jealousy,  aggressive greed,  and  compensa- 
tory and defensive  tendencies. 
In addition,   learning theory was  thought to play a major role 
in maintaining dishonest behavior.     The researchers claimed  that "Unless 
there is some change  in resistance to the tendency to deceive,  an in- 
crease in the profits  from deception will increase the amount of decep- 
tion   (Hartshorne    &    May,  p.   393)."    On the other hand,   attendance or 
membership in Sunday school  and other organizations presumed  to en- 
courage honesty among  its members was  found  to have no effect on cheat- 
ing behavior. 
Hartshorne and May are probably be6t known for their "bag of 
virtues" approach  to moral behavior.     Indeed,   their entire research 
study was oriented  to the behavioral manifestation of moral virtues. 
Lack of agreement on those qualities which constitute true virtues has 
been recognized  in recent years as the most obvious  inadequcy in this 
approach   (Kohlberg & Turiel,   1971;   Blatt & Kohlberg,   1973):    one man's 
honesty is another man's rudeness or  insensitivity  to others.     This 
philosophy therefore puts one  in the unfortunate plight of trying to 
be all  things  to all men. 
Another well-known and  clinically documented  study in the moral 
field was that of Havighurst and Taba  (1949).     Studying internall- 
zation of moral  standards by measuring character reputation,   they 
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identified certain personality "types" as being influential on moral 
character development.  Moral character, personality, and social en- 
vironment appeared to be related in a systematic way, and the researchers 
concluded that moral character could not be usefully studied apart from 
total personality. 
Investigating the relation of specific personal and environmental 
factors to character development, the team found the highest positive 
correlation coefficients resulting from comparisons of moral reputation 
and school achievement (r * .74) and moral reputation and social class 
position (r ■ .52).  The hypothesis that good social adjustment contrib- 
utes to good character was supported to the extent that the researchers 
were prompted to state that "Any young person who experiences success and 
security in home, school, church and other groups is influenced strongly 
to adopt the prevailing code of morality and to govern his actions accord- 
ingly (p. 182)."  Social and group pressures were thus recognized as 
powerful determinants of conforming behavior. 
However, like Hartshorne and May (1928), Havighurst and Taba 
found a very low correlation between religious activity and character 
reputation ( r ■ ■< .34).  This may be a more significant finding than 
the comparable Hartshorne and May result, since reputation ratings 
often are Influenced by outwardly conforming behavior, and may consti- 
tute positive exaggerations of actual standards and beliefs.  Berkowitz 
(1964) has more recently reported social class but not religious activity, 
such as belonging to an organized church and learning conventional re- 
ligious values, to be positively associated with general moral develop- 
ment. 
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By the  late   1950'8,  at  least one group of Investigators was 
concerned with conscience development as a key area in moral  research 
(Soars,  Maccoby,  & Levin,   1957).     Conscience was perceived as  level of 
internal self-control,  which ideally,  should be balanced against ex- 
ternal  controls,   such as  the fear of punishment.     Characterizing con- 
science as "self-maintenance of control  in the face of temptation and 
the occurrence of guilt   feelings when temptation is not overcome," 
the researchers adopted  the notion made popular by the psychoanalytic 
theory that true moral behavior is constraining  in nature,  primarily 
oriented to avoiding and  resisting temptation. 
One major  factor   thought to  influence heavily the rate of con- 
science development wa6  the childhood process of  identification.     De- 
fining  identification as a  learning  task through which the child  identifies 
with and becomes intimately attached  to the sex role and  lifestyle of his 
like-sexed parent,   Sears,   et al.   noted sex differences in rate of iden- 
tification;  boys were  slower to fully identify with the  father  than 
girls were to identify with the mother.     The investigators saw this 
difference as a  function of mother-oriented child-rearing.    Stating that 
sex-role  identification is accomplished through a combination of trial- 
and-error  learning,  direct tuition,  and role play,   the team concluded 
that young males were  lagging in appropriate sex-role identification 
because of their more difficult  task of changing the focus of  identi- 
fication from the mother,  with whom they spent a great deal of time, 
imitating her in return for her love,   to the father, with whom they 
spent considerably less time for imitation or encouragement through 
praise and affection. 
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With such importance accorded to the identification process, it 
is not surprising to find that Sears, et al. considered age to be a 
prime factor in conscience development.  The pre-puberty years were 
thought to be most important for solid character formation. Although 
considerable differences were recognized in the rate of development 
of internal control, most children were thought to be well into this 
process by the sixth year.  So stated the authors, "There is a learning 
of internal control that goes on mainly in the years before puberty, 
perhaps even chiefly in the first six to ten years of life, which estab- 
lishes the extent to which the conscience will operate throughout the 
rest of life (p. 367)." 
Parental discipline techniques, surveyed separately, were found 
to be effective, to differing degrees, in prompting signs of con- 
science, such as guilt and confession. Warm, love-oriented techniques 
appeared to be most effective when complemented with withdrawal of love, 
upon transgression by the child.  The investigators, however, were quick 
to note the possible discrepancies between apparent manifestations of 
conscience and true self-control. Becker (1964) has supported the evi- 
dence pointing to the effectiveness of love-oriented disc ipline. 
Thus, early research in moral development was oriented to inves- 
tigation of moral traits and identification of those factors thought to 
be influential in moral behavior.  Emphasis was on the study of internali- 
zation of conventional moral codes and standards, and behavioral con- 
formity to social rule6.  The study of morals and morality was often 
approached negatively; that is, a moral person was one who did not 
cheat. 
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Piaget's Cognitive Stagesmd Moral Development 
Although  twentieth century research in the moral field has 
been voluminous,   the Kohlberg approach to moral development  is based 
largely on the work of one European scientist.     From Piaget's   (1932) 
ideas on developmental cognitive stages,  Kohlberg vamped his  theory 
of moral development,  basing it on the natural advancement of  logical 
reasoning.     Because Piaget's account of reasoning, decision-making 
and mental   function is  so basic  to Kohlberg's approach,  a concerted 
effort will be made at this point to present the fundamental principles 
of Piagetian developmental  theory. 
Piaget identified four stages or eras, of cognitive development, 
after years of scientific observation and questioning of many children, 
including his own: 
1. Era   I,   (approximately 0-2 years),   the era of sensori-motor 
intelligence 
2. Era   II,   (approximately 2-5 years),   the era of symbolic, 
intuitive,   or prelogical  thought 
3. Era   III,   (approximately 6-10 years),   the era of concrete 
operational thought 
4. Era   IV,   (approximately 11-adulthood),  the era of formal 
operational thought       (Kohlberg & Gilligan,   1973,  p.   1063). 
According to Piaget,   advancement  in perception and understanding, 
or movement  to the next  stage occurs in broad terms when the child 
incorporates a new body or schemata of responses into his own existing 
repertoire of  responses.     When he has  internalized or assimilated  the 
new knowledge   such  that  it becomes a part of his functional,  cognitive 
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way of understanding and responding  to the world,  he begins operating 
at a higher level of cognitive development.     The entire process of 
stimulation,   assimilation,  and progression is  the result of organism 
interaction with   the  environment, and is  subject to rate of physical 
maturation and opportunity for environmental  stimulation. 
The pattern of thinking  in the young child who is probably at 
Era  II of cognitive development,   is characterized by the irrational pro- 
cesses   of  juxtaposition and  syncretism.     Juxtaposition presupposes 
the adjoining of unrelated events;   the child's  thinking is apparently 
independent of the need  to form relationships.     Each thought is unique 
unto itself,   although  it may be paired,  in  the  same breath, with another 
totally irrelevant  thought.     This pattern ensures a lack of any inter- 
nal consistency or necessity in the thinking process.    The opposite 
of juxtaposition,   syncretism presupposes the connection of everything 
with every other  thing;   unrelated  things are falsely related  in the 
child's mind.     In addition,  ego-centrism complicates the child's under- 
standing  to the extent  that he  is  unable to place himself at another's 
point of view;   he generally thinks  for himself, without troubling to 
make himself understood by others.     Implied   is an "undifferentiated 
state in which cause  is confused with reason,  motive, and   in a 
sense, consequence       (p.  20)."    Oriented   to absolutes,  rigid rules, 
and   the ultimate power of adult authority,   the child justifies the 
existence of the world by  the fact  that  it does exist.     He argues  in 
the same way,   by simply affirming or appealing to authority,  but 
never by really substantiating his  statements. 
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To  the very young child at Era   II,   the world  is both physical 
and psychical at once,   an assemblage of willed and well-regulated 
actions and  intentions.     The idea of mere chance is absent  from his 
thinking,   leaving no room in the child's mind  for  fortuitous or     in- 
explicable events;   in simpler  terms,  everything can be justified. 
According to Fiaget,  "There  is  ...   a universal tendency on 
the part of  the child  to avoid  relations and  to replace them by 
notions  that  can be thought of in themselves as something absolute 
(p.   127)."    Since  the child  reasons only about isolated,  or particular 
cases,   generalization and,  consequently,   any sustained deduction do 
not come naturally to him.     Necessity,   reciprocity and reversibility 
are notably missing from the young child's reasoning.     Such charac- 
teristics may give rise  to  those undesirable childhood attitudes re- 
ferred  to as stubbornness and willfulness. 
With  the cognitive foundation thus  laid,   the child of 2-5 years 
makes decisions and  judgments with moral  thinking  that is similarly 
irrational and   inconsistent.     Operating at  the first of  two possible 
moral  stages,   labeled heteronomous by Piaget,   the young child notably 
relies most on adult sanction,   accepts rules as rigid   laws,  and  judges 
situations according to their  immediate physical consequences.     Last- 
ing until around  the sixth year of age,   the heteronomous moral stage 
is typified by the "tendency  ...   to regard duty and  the value attach- 
ing  to it as self-subsistent and   independent of the mind,   imposing  it- 
self regardless of the circumstances  in which the  individual may find him- 
self  (Piaget,   1932    p. 20X"  Piaget refers to this trait as moral 
realism,   to which he attributes three key features: 
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1. Duty is essentially heteronomous;   it  is valid  simply 
because  it is asked.     To "do right"  is to obey the 
will of the adult;   to "do wrong"   is to have a will 
of one's own. 
2. Emphasis  is on the  letter,  rather than the spirit, 
of the  law. 
3. Responsibility is viewed objectively;  acts are judged 
according to their exact conformity to the rules 
(Piaget,   1932,  p.   107). 
When asked by Piaget which act was worse,  breaking one cup 
while "pulling"  a  6tealthy trick,  or breaking  fifteen cups  in complete 
innocence,   children at  the heteronomous  stage almost always said  that 
breaking fifteen cups was worse and deserved more    punishment because 
the damage was greater. 
Because reversibility is  lacking cognitively,   the child  is 
unable   to enter  into a relationship of mutual respect with adults. 
Unilateral respect  for those  in authority,  which is the product of 
great amounts of restraint imposed upon the child by adults,  provokes 
moral realism and   the objective view of responsibility.     Thus,   Piaget 
believes the adult  encourages unilateral respect for authority by im- 
posing categorical obligations on the child before his mind has properly- 
assimilated  them.     These obligations, whether practiced or not,   acquire 
the value of ritual necessities,   and forbidden things take on the  sig- 
nificance of  taboos. 
In keeping with  this pattern of thought the child's conception 
of justice is quite  immature and rigid.     Violation of any rule brings 
about automatic punishment,   the most  just  form of which is retributive 
and  severe in nature.    To his way of thinking,   then,   the "be6t"   forms 
of punishment are  those incorporating isolation, deprivation,  or other 
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expiatory measures.     Piaget found   that children under ages seven or 
eight interpreted most means  for handling wrongdoing,  even non-expiatory 
forms of punishment,   such as reciprocity and censure, as being expiatory 
penalties deserved by wrong-doers. 
Valuing retributive justice in this way  (even up to age nine,   this 
is true of about  50% of all children),   the young child does not really 
understand  the equalitarian principle upon which distributive judgment 
is founded   (p.   255).     Unilateral respect,   a constant  in the young child, 
does,  by its very nature,  constitute an obstacle  to the free development 
of the principle of equality. 
Justice,  at   this  early cognitive stage,   Era   II, acquires the 
properties of  imminence  and  immediacy.     Wrongdoing  is thought  to incur 
its own punishment,   automatically,   from which  there  is no escape.     In 
a  story situation involving a punishment of  falling into a creek from 
a rotting bridge that collapsed,  Piaget  found  that  little children 
tended  to see  this  incident as a result  of the bridge-crosser's "bad- 
ness"  and his "need"   to be punished.     Piaget also noted  that children 
often perceive  their own misfortunes as "punishments"  from God.    Again, 
the adult plays an important role in fostering such concepts,   since 
parents often take advantage of everyday situations  to teach their 
children a "moral"   lesson by pointing out   the imminence of God's jus- 
tice through  such phrases  as "See, God  is punishing you.'   (p.   106)." 
Unilateral respect  for ultimate authority is  thus reinforced  in a dif- 
ferent but effective way. 
Piaget  contends  that   such one-sidedness  is not harmful however, 
since unilateral respect  tends,   of itself,   to grow into mutual respect 
20 
which gives rise to a tendency toward cooperation. Arrested moral 
development occurs only when there is a decisive inner submission to 
the will of others, or there is a willful, sustained revolt against 
developmental progression. 
Transition to the autonomous, or more mature stage of moral 
development in Piaget's theory, is a natural advancement, occurring 
generally between the ages of six and ten years, and progressing 
through any of innumberable intermediate stages. At least one feature 
is distinctive in the thinking of a child in transition: his reason- 
ing is approaching logic, becoming grounded on direct observation. 
Although he still has difficulty in reasoning from premises that he 
does not actually believe, his thinking still is far more advanced 
than that of the moral realist, who consistently confuses fantasy and 
reality. 
Beginning the transition to higher moral thinking is a mani- 
festation of a similar change that is occurring in cognitive structure. 
The child attains Era III which enables him to make operations upon 
concrete objects.  He is able to maintain conservation of number, 
length, mass, and class membership, in the face of apparent change. 
Consequently, he begins some generalization and keeping of the rules, 
even in the absence of adult sanction.  Consideration of intention 
begins to play a more significant role in the moral decision-making 
process.  Piaget notes that it is not uncommon to find the tendency to 
judge acts according to consequence and the ability to judge according 
to intention co-existing in the same child  (p. 129).  Each cog- 
nitive and moral step forward is the result of increasing generalization 
and differentiation of assimilated skills and knowledge. 
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Concerning  justice,   the concrete operational child, as a result 
of his growing  ability to formulate reciprocal relationships,  begins 
to justify punishment as a means  for putting things right;  expiation 
is no  longer as important as restoring  the status quo.     However,  al- 
though  the notion of reciprocal justice predominates over  that of ex- 
piatory punishment,  both notions may be  found  at all ages. 
Growth of  the concept of mutual respect  fosters recognition of 
distributive justice and  the notion of equality.    The older child, 
generally,   becomes more concerned with protecting  the rights of the 
innocent  than with punishing  the guilty. 
Accomplishing reversibility in thought,   the ability to reason 
from another's point of view,  and  conservation of relationships,   the 
child of  11 or   12 years becomes aware of the principle of equity and 
its adequacy as an operable principle,   even superceding the principle 
of equality in some cases. 
Advancing  from the concrete operational  stage,   thinking becomes 
more abstract and deductive;   one  is better able to consider special or 
individual circumstances before judging an event or act.     Views of pun- 
ishment change to admit  the adequacy of simple reciprocal measures, 
such as censure or restitution, where punishment  is deemed  necessary. 
The  formal operational  stage  in cognitive development   thus  implies a 
strictness,  necessity,   and  consistency characteristic of the mature 
reasoning process.     Reasoning about pure possibility is not only pos- 
sible,  but highly probable.     Reality exists in three recognizable and 
hierarchical planes:     play,  verbal reality,  and  observation,  as opposed 
to the confusion of juxtaposed,  non-hierarchical planes of reality and 
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play in the pre-concrete child. Autonomous moral reasoning is ideally 
attained once formal cognitive operations are stabilized. It is char- 
acterized by consideration of intention as the criterion for judging a 
situation, mutual  respect,  and retaliation and exchange. 
Piaget   (1952)   contends  that "The child's mind  shows signs of 
having a  structure of  its own  ...     (p.   200),"  and  that "there 
is the existence of a sort of  law of evolution in the moral develop- 
ment of the child     (p.   199)." Such  statements imply an inherent pat- 
tern of development,   each  stage of which is unique and structurally dif- 
ferent  from the others;   a pattern common to all children,   always  follow- 
ing the  same direction,  and thus dependent upon common growth  factors. 
Yet Piaget also mentions social  and  environmental  factors which 
influence development;   parents  influence the attainment of reciprocity, 
mutual respect,   and  other principles of  formal  thinking by the examples 
they themselves  set.     Peer-group pressure becomes increasingly important 
to the older child: 
At about the age of eleven or  twelve,  social  life starts a new 
phase,  obviously having  the effect  of leading children to a 
greater mutual understanding and giving  them the habit of con- 
stantly placing themselves at points of view which  they did  not 
previously hold.     This progress in  the use of assumptions  is 
probably what   lends greater  suppleness to the child's  conception 
of modality,   and   teaches him the use of formal reasoning 
Cognitive dissonance,   stimulated by environmental novelty or problems, 
is necessary for   the realization of the inadequacy of current thinking 
and resultant  seeking of a more adequate   level of reasoning which  leads 
to progression to the next  stage. 
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The developmental approach, therefore, refutes the notion of 
"wired-in" basic cognitive structures; rather, it purports such struc- 
tures to be general forms of equilibrium, resulting from interaction 
between organism and environment.  The use of stages as a structural 
framework is also significant in developmental theory.  Specific char- 
acteristics are implied by a proposed developmental stage hierarchy: 
1. Each stage, having its own structure, represents a mode 
of thinking that is qualitatively different from that 
of every other stage. 
2. Consistency of level of response is implied by the 
notion of different developmental structures. 
3. The stages form an invariant, sequential hierarchy, 
each stage being more differentiated and integrated 
than the preceding stage.  The order of developmental 
stage progression cannot be changed, although cultural 
teaching and/or experience may affect the rate of 
progression. 
As these characteristics are applied to cognitive development, 
it is important to note a most significant difference between the 
development of concrete operations and formal operations.  It appears 
that the more adequate stage of formal reasoning is much more diffi- 
cult to attain than its prerequisite stage of concrete reasoning. 
Specifically, all children, ultimately, attain some clear capacity 
for concrete-logical reasoning, generally between the ages of five 
and nine.  The transition to formal thought, on the other hand, is 
extremely variable as to time, and for many people, it never occurs 
at all.  In one study of 265 American parents and their children, the 
percentage of those displaying clear formal operational reasoning by 
age was as follows: 
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Age 10 to  15,     457. 
Age 16 to 20,     537. 
Age 21 to 30,     657. 
Age 45 to 50,     577. (Kohlberg & Gllligan,   1973,  p.   1065). 
The figures  Indicate that a  surprisingly  large proportion of 
Americans never develop  the  capacity for abstract  thought,  and of 
those who do,   full  formal thinking may    not be attained until   the third 
decade of  life.     In addition,   there seems  to be no  further  signifi- 
cant development of  formal reasoning after age 30.     The most  obvious 
implication from the data,  however,   is that no cognitive stage can be 
equated with a definite age period,   a contention which Piaget has held 
for many years. 
In comparison,  Kohlberg has viewed moral development as a 
parallel  to cognitive development.     Although his approach  is   largely 
an expansion of Piaget's  two developmental moral stages,  Kohlberg re- 
fers to cognitive  stages as a prerequisite  for  formulation of moral 
thinking.     The following section will be an explanation of Kohlberg's 
moral development   theory. 
Kohlberg's Moral Development Theory 
After exploring developmental theory,   and   thus, heavily in- 
fluenced by Piaget,   Kohlberg   (1958,   1963) ultimately postulated  six 
invariant   stages of moral development. 
The six stages are grouped under  three  levels of moral develop- 
ment with their defining attitudinal characteristics as described 
below: 
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Level   I.     Preconventional   level.    Values reside In external happenings 
or consequences  rather than persons or rules. 
Stage 1.     Orientation toward punishment and  reward,  unquestioning 
deference  to superior power.     The physical consequences 
of action regardless of their human meaning or value 
determine  its goodness or badness. 
Stage 2.     Right  action consists of that which  instrumentally 
satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs 
of others.     Elements of fairness,   reciprocity,   and 
equal   sharing are present,  but they are  always  inter- 
preted  in a  physical pragmatic way.     Reciprocity is a 
matter of "you scratch my back and   I'll  scratch yours," 
not of  loyalty,  gratitude,  or justice. 
Level   II.     Conventional  level.     Value resides in good  and bad  roles 
and   in maintenance of  the conventional order of reward and 
punishment. 
Stage 3.     Good-boy orientation.    Good  behavior  is  that which 
pleases or helps others and is approved by them. 
There  is much  conformity  to stereotypical  images 
of what  is majority or "natural" behavior.    Behavior 
is often judged by intention - "he means well" be- 
comes  important for the   first   time and  is overused. 
One seeks approval by being "nice." 
Stage 4.     Orientation toward  authority,   fixed  rules,  and   the 
maintenance of  the  social order.     Right behavior 
consists of doing one's duty,   showing respect  for 
authority,  and  maintaining the given social order 
for  its own sake.    One earns respect by performing 
dutifully. 
Level   III.     Postconventional  or principled   level.     Value resides in 
the conformity of the  self  to some shared  standard  of 
judgment and defined  rights and duties. 
Stage 5.    A social-contract orientation,   generally with  legal- 
istic and  utilitarian overtones.     Right action tends 
to be defined   in terms of general rights and  in terms 
of  standards which have been critically examined  and 
agreed upon by  the whole society.    There  is a clear 
awareness of the relativism of personal values and 
opinions and a  corresponding emphasis upon procedural 
rules for  reaching consensus.     Emphasis  is on the  legal 
point of view,   but with consideration of the possibility 
of changing  law in terms of social utility.     Outside 
the  legal realm,   free agreement and contract are the 
binding elements of obligation. 
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Stage 6.     Orientation toward ethical principles appealing  to 
logical  comprehensiveness,   universality,  and consis- 
tency.     These principles are abstract and ethical; 
they are universal principles of justice,  of the 
reciprocity and equality of human rights,  and of 
respect   for  the dignity of human beings as  individual 
persons   (Kohlberg & Gilligan,   1973, pp.   1067-1068). 
His original research consisted  of  72 case    studies of  suburban 
Chicago delinquent and  normal boys,  aged  10,   13,  and   16 years   (Kohlberg, 
1958).     For each participant,  measures of socio-economic status,  popu- 
larity,  and   I.Q.  were obtained. 
The content of Kohlberg's  taped   interview observations consisted 
of the actual verbal solving,   by each participant,  of  10 hypothetical 
moral-dilemma situations,   and   the probing of the thinking underlying 
the subject's choice.     Probing of underlying  thoughts,   or cognitive 
structure,  was done by a series of predetermined questions concerning 
the  subject's response. 
Each taped  statement was transcribed and rated on a  180-cell 
scale which classified  it as to motivational aspect of  thought   (30) 
times stage of moral development   (6) per aspect.     Individual scores 
were computed  for each of  the 6  stages of moral development,  based on 
the percentage of all the  individual's  statements which were of  that 
given stage.    Analyses of variance of the percentage usage of each 
stage of thought by the three age groups showed that the differences 
between them in usage of all types of thought but one  (Stage 3) were 
found  to be  significant beyond  the  .01 level.     Kohlberg ascertained  the 
attitudinal  factors which characterize each of the stages and  thus de- 
termine moral judgment from the responses of the subject  to moral 
dilemma situations. 
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Kohlberg has expanded on his approach considerably in the six- 
teen years of research  since his original  1958 postulations,  and the 
stage hierarchy has become more  sophisticated.     Stage 5 is now thought 
to have two substages of its own,   the  first of which  is as described 
above as Stage  5,  and  the second being an approximation of Stage 6, 
with a belief  in internal decisions of conscience,  yet without clear 
recognition of rational or universal principles.     Kohlberg has also 
documented a transition stage which develops during the change  from 
conventional   (Stage 4)  to principled   (Stage 5)   thinking.     Labeled 
Stage 4B,   this   step resembles,  at   least  in content,  Stage 2  thinking; 
at one time  it was  thought  to represent  temporary regression in moral 
development,   but   it was misplaced because  the regression was not a 
structural one   (Kohlberg & Kramer,   1969). 
Another advancement  in theoretical construct  is Kohlberg's more 
recent identification of three modes or basic forms or kinds of moral 
judgment:     (a)   judgments of the rightness and duty of an act;   (b) 
judgments of desert or moral worth of action;   and   (c)   judgments of the 
value and  truth of norms,  ends,  and groups,  apart  from a particular act. 
Also identified were three elements or basic considerations which impose 
positive or negative value on acts,  actors,  or norms:     (a)  the future 
welfare and perfection of persons;   (b)   the past origin or present 
authority of persons and  rules;   and   (c)   justice:     ideal  symmetrical 
relations between action defining the claims of one person on another. 
Finally,  Kohlberg has also delineated  twelve basic issues which are aspects 
of moral decision-making,  and are necessarily involved  in related dilemma- 
solvings.     Kohlberg labels the issues thus: 
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1. Social rules 
2. The  self,   the  ideal self,  and conscience 
3. Motive given for rule obedience or moral action 
4. Helping roles,   involving cooperation,  helpfulness,  and affection 
Si Authority  issues and roles,  governmental roles 
6. Civil   liberties 
7. Contract,  promise,  and  reciprocity 
8. Punitive justice 
9. Life as a value and a right 
10. Property 
11. Truth 
12. Self and   sexual  love   (Kohlberg and Turiel,   1971, pp.   432-433) 
True to developmental theory,  Kohlberg's approach defines the 
structure of each moral stage as being more differentiated and more 
integrated  than that of the previous stage.     Accordingly,  at each 
higher stage,   the same basic moral issue is defined  in a way that  is 
raore differentiated,  more integrated,  and more general or universal. 
Taking one of  the moral  issues,  value of life,   for example,   typical 
thought construction for each stage would be as follows: 
Stage  1.     The value of a human  life is confused with the 
value of physical objects and  is based on the 
social  status or physical attributes of its 
possessor. 
Stage 2.     The value of a human  life is seen as instrumen- 
tal to  the satisfaction of the needs of its 
possessor or of other persons. 
Stage 3. The value of a human life is based on the empathy 
and affection of family members and others toward 
its possessor. 
I 
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Stage l*.     Life is conceived as  sacred  in terms of its 
place  in a categorical moral or religious 
order of rights and duties. 
Stage 5. Life is valued both in terms of its relation 
to community welfare and in terms of being a 
universal human right. 
Stage 6.     Belief  in the sacredness of human life as 
representing a universal human value of re- 
spect for the individual (Kohlberg & Gilli- 
gan,   1973,  p.   1068). 
Each  step of development represents a better cognitive organization 
than the one before it,   taking account of everything present  in the 
previous stage,   but making new distinctions and organizing  them into 
a more comprehensive or more equilibrated  structure. 
Because of the close and even symbiotic relationship of moral 
and cognitive stages, it is appropriate at this point to compare the 
ideas of Kohlberg and Piaget according to their respective theories. 
It will be shown that, while Kohlberg's moral stages necessitate 
stable functioning at the parallel cognitive stage, they essentially 
constitute a more thoroughly analyzed and categorized expansion of 
Piaget's theory of moral developmental stages. 
The  first and most    outstanding similarity of Kohlberg's 
approach to Piaget's approach,   is the basic foundation in stages 
which represent a developmental sequence.     Those characteristics 
thought   to be structurally inherent  to cognitive developmental stages, 
qualitative differentiation,   consistency,   invariance,  and  hierarchiza- 
tion, have been cross-culturally validated as typifying moral develop- 
ment also  (Kohlberg,   1969;   Kohlberg & Turiel,   1971;   Kohlberg & Gilli- 
gan,   1973). 
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In terms of mental  structure and ability for decision-making, 
there is a positive correlation between cognitive development and 
readiness for  advancement  in moral development,  according to Kohlberg 
and Gilligan   (1973).     Relations between Piaget's logical stages and 
Kohlberg's moral  stages are presented below.    Kohlberg clearly and 
consistently reminds  the reader that all relations are such that 
attainment of  the  logical stages  is necessary,  but not sufficient, 
for attainment of the moral  stages. 
Logical  stage 
Symbolic,   Intuitive  thought 
Moral   stage 
Stage 0:     The good  is what  I want and 
like. 
Concrete operations,  Substage 1    Stage   1:     Punishment-obedience orienta- 
Categorical classification tion 
Concrete operations,   Substage 2    Stage 2:     Instrumental hedonism and 
Reversible concrete  thought concrete reciprocity 
Formal operations,   Substage   1 Stage 3:     Orientation to interpersonal 
Relations involving the inverse relations of mutuality 
of the reciprocal 
Formal  operations,   Substage  2 
Formal   operations,   Substage  3 
Stage 4:     Maintenance of social order, 
fixed rules,  and authority 
Stage 5A:     Social contract,  utilitarian 
law-making perspective 
Stage 5B:     Higher law and  conscience 
orientation 
Stage 6:     Universal ethical principle 
orientation (p.   1068). 
The first Piagetian stage  listed   is that period beginning after 
the era of sensori-motor intelligence.     Characterized by symbolic in- 
tuitive thought,   this stage has been intricately described by Piaget, 
but surprisingly  little research on moral thinking has been done by 
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Kohlberg with  children at  this very young age   (years 2-5).     However, 
current Kohlberg researchers are beginning to explore methods for 
measuring moral  thinking  in preschool children by designing new 
dilemma  situations,   appropriate  for  the comprehension range of this 
age group,  which allow for probing of reasoning at  this difficult age 
(Gordon,   1974).     The need  for research in this area of moral develop- 
ment reflects the  limits of Kohlberg's research, which has  largely 
involved  the  interviewing of children in grades 4 through  12, and 
college  students. 
Presumably,  however,   Piaget's heteronomous stage thinking  is 
active at  this age,  and   the writer notes from personal experience, 
that in simple recitations of Piagetian dilemma stories to four-year- 
olds in an informal  setting,  responses were found to be quite similar, 
and  in some cases,   identical to those prototypical heteronomouse state- 
ments documented by Piaget   (Schwarz,   1973). 
In the older preschool child,   to whom reality and  fantasy appear 
to be the  same,   and  confusion of relations is typical,   the decline of 
prelogical  thinking begins generally between the ages of  five and  seven 
years,  as concrete  logical patterns of   thought  formulate cognitively. 
The child develops  the  stage of categorical operations,   among others 
(Substage   I), which sets the stage for attainment of the first premoral 
stage,  or Kohlberg's Stage   1. 
At  this point,   the child  labels environmental experiences as 
good or bad,   according  to the way they affect his own welfare, which 
is his only point of reference.    Oriented  to superior and authority 
figures,   the   (Kohlberg) Stage 1 child imitates the adult and categorizes 
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his environment as he  is  instructed  by or  learns from the adult. 
Justification of the "goodness" or "badness"  of an event  is implied 
by its very existence,  or  is confused with other features associated 
with the event requiring explanation.     For example, when asked,  "Why 
does the  sun not  fall down?"   the typical seven-year-old may say,  "Be- 
cause it   is hot"  or "Because it is high     (Piaget,   1952,  p.   227)."   It will 
be    remembered       that syncretism is high at this age. 
Substage   II of Piaget'6 concrete operations corresponds to 
Kohlberg's Stage 2,  which is still categorized as premoral   thought, 
but is structured  for  the potential recognition of another's point 
of view.     As  the child develops the operations of transitive 6eria- 
tion and  conservation,   concrete thought becomes reversible and  the 
child begins  to establish reciprocal relationships.     Other people 
are becoming  important  to him but at  this immature  stage,   relationships 
are typically manipulated  to his advantage.     The child's view of re- 
ciprocal moral  relations  is a "blow for blow" philosophy,   representing 
simple reciprocal exchange.     He makes decisions upon the basis of that 
which is most real  to him,   in keeping with Piaget's view of  the parallel- 
ing cognitive  stage:     "The concrete operational child adopts  the hypo- 
thesis that seems most probable or  likely to him  (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 
1973, p.   1060)." 
The transition from concrete operational thought to formal 
operations is regarded by Piaget (and by Kohlberg) as the most sig- 
nificant step forward in the cognitive developmental process.  It 
heralds the beginning of abstract thinking and the ability to "reason 
about reason."  It is at this stage that one is first able to consider 
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sheer possibility;   hypotheses are established and  tested  in a  sophis- 
ticated manner, which may include the isolation of variables and  the 
arriving at deductive,   systematic conclusions. 
Kohlberg sees advancement  into the first  substage of formal 
operations as a necessary prerequisite for attainment of Stage 3 in 
moral thinking.    A person at Stage 3  thinking, having developed  the 
ability to order  even triads of propositions or relations,  becomes 
necessarily aware of his own position in relation to others.     Lasting, 
mutual relationships become  important as he sees himself from dif- 
ferent perspectives.     Concern for such relationships may necessarily 
foster the currying of others'   favor.     The immediacy of negative 
classes   (of all not-nice,   for example) may encourage the person at 
Stage 3 to categorize and  stereotype. 
Piaget's Substage 2  formal operations enables one to order or 
reverse relations,   and thus  to hierarchize and   to set priorities 
through deductive reasoning.    Accordingly, a person functioning at 
Kohlberg's Stage 4 moral development is concerned with  the ordering 
and hierarchizing of society,   and with maintaining the status quo. 
Values are ordered  and given fixed positions. 
True  formal  thought  is possible only when the final substage 
of formal operations is mastered.    A person at  this  level of cognitive 
development is able to perform "operations upon operations";  construc- 
tion of all possible combinations of relations is the most probable 
mode of thought.     Certainly this  logical advancement with the ability 
to reason about  sheer possibility establishes  the foundation for  the 
abstract,   theoretical thinking characteristic of the fifth moral 
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developmental  stage.     At Stage 5,  which Kohlberg refers to as principled, 
postconventional  or autonomous,  one is able to see the need  for a social 
system,   its control and maintenance,  while at the same time recognizing 
the cultural relativity of all social  systems.    "The rejection of con- 
ventional moral reasoning begins with  the perception of relativism, 
the awareness  that any given society's definition of right and wrong 
however  legitimate,   is only one among many,  both  in fact and   theory 
(Kohlberg & Gilligan,   1973,   p.   1072)." 
Admitting  the necessity of  law and order as a principle,  but 
transcending a person's Stage 4 dedication to maintaining the status 
quo,   the person at  Stage 5 sees the best  social order as that which 
meets the needs of   the majority of the population,  while providing 
for individual rights,   liberties and responsibilities. 
Vaguely aware  of  the universality of moral principles and dis- 
tinctly aware of the relativity of cultural norms,   it  is the principled 
thinker at Stage  5 who can see  the need   for new or modified  laws,  or 
for the deletion of  laws made obsolete by social change.    Most  impor- 
tantly,   the person at Stage 5 who is able to view all legal systems 
as culturally relative,   is more able  to clearly discern those values 
and rights which appear  to be valid cross-culturally.     Thus,  he is 
better able to objectively judge those situations and events apart 
from the group  to which he  is  tied or with which he himself is  identi- 
fied.     Therefore,  because of  hl»      increased  insight into the structure 
of universal moral  truths,   the person at Stage 5 is probably more strongly 
committed   to a  system which maintains these  ideals  than a person at Stage 
4 who supports his society simply to ensure the status quo or  to avoid 
change which would  interrupt familiar patterns of social control. 
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Another  logical operation reached at Piaget's final Substage 3 
is the systematic  isolation of variables and  true deductive reasoning. 
Since Kohlberg's Stage  6 of moral development is oriented  to purely 
theoretical,   ethical principles,   it is evident that the highest  level 
of logical comprehensiveness is necessary for  the moral  thinking 
typical of  this  6tage.     The principles upon which  this highest develop- 
mental  6tage  is based  are abstract, philosophical  ideas shown to be 
universally valid  and  consistent.    Given the complex nature of this 
mode of thinking,   and   the rarely-attained conditions for its develop- 
ment,   it  is not  surprising that  few people make any realistic use of 
Stage 6 thinking   (Kohlberg,   summer workshop,   1974). 
However,  a  truly morally-principled person,   functioning autono- 
mously at Stage 5 or 6, may manifest  the  lifestyle of a person function- 
ing at Stage 4,   since  the more advanced moral  thinker realizes the 
necessity of social control through  law and order,   custom,  and  tradition, 
for a civilized   society. 
Stage  7, which has been hypothesized  by Kohlberg but not researched, 
is a horizontal expansion on the principled  structure of Stage 6,   and 
will be discussed   later. 
It should be re-emphasized at  this point that Kohlberg cautions 
against equating cognitive and moral stages,  and contends  that all rela- 
tionships between the  two developmental hierarchies  are that attainment 
of the   logical  stage  is necessary but not  in any way sufficient,   for 
attainment of  the moral  stage.    True to the developmental approach, 
Kohlberg sees natural progression in the moral realm comparable to 
cognitive progression;   that  is,  progression is the result of organism 
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and environmental  interaction.     Cognitive development   is,  of necessity, 
the forerunner of moral development,  but attainment of a cognitive stage 
does not  imply simultaneous attainment of the moral  stage.     On the other 
hand,   reaching  a moral stage always  implies attainment of  the corres- 
ponding cognitive  stage,   since  logical  structure is basic  to moral 
thinking. 
However,  moral   judgment stages do not  represent  the mere appli- 
cation of logic  to moral  situations.     In one study cited by Kohlberg and 
Gilligan in 1973,  Kohlberg  found  that 60% of persons over age  16 had 
attained   formal operational  thinking,  yet only  10% of subjects over  16 
showed  clear,  principled moral thinking.     It will be remembered  that 
the transition from concrete to formal cognitive operations is not 
automatic.     This accounts for  the   lag  in principled moral  thinking by 
many cognitively advanced persons.     Those persons who have attained 
the higher  levels of moral  thinking have had experiences in which the 
lower cognitive and moral levels were  inadequate. 
The Kohlberg moral development  theory has been shown to be 
intricately associated  with and indeed,  dependent upon Piagetian 
theory of cognitive stage development.     It  is appropriate at  this 
point to delineate the boundaries of Piaget's moral  stages and  to 
compare them with Kohlberg's stages,   the latter of which constitute 
a more thoroughly analyzed, expanded version of the former. 
Piaget's  first  moral   (heteronomous)   stage is comparable to 
Kohlberg's Stage  1 of moral development  in terms of orientation to 
authority and reward,  and avoidance of punishment. 
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The second Plagetian moral   (autonomous)   stage is comparable in 
differing degrees,   to Kohlberg Stages 2-6.     The principles upon which 
it  is based are  found  in Kohlberg's hierarchy,   from Stages 2-6,  but 
the mode of operating upon these principles,  according to Kohlberg, 
is structurally different  in each stage.     For example,  a person at 
Kohlberg's Stage 2   takes  into account  intention.     Piaget   (1932) de- 
scribes intention as one of  the  first notable characteristics of 
autonomous thinking;   but a person at Stage 2,  knowing the  intention, 
still typically uses the situation to his own advantage. 
Accordingly,   reciprocity is generally an influential factor 
in the thinking characteristic of both the Piagetian autonomous 
stage and  the Kohlberg Stage 2.    At Stage 2 of Kohlberg's hierarchy, 
reciprocity is not  the  ethical principle implied by  the Golden Rule; 
rather,   it is  the  instrumental philosophy of "I'll do unto you if you 
do unto me"  and represents perfect reciprocal exchange.     Obviously, 
Piaget had  the more noble idea of just reciprocity in mind when he 
characterized his autonomous stage.     However,  Kohlberg maintains that 
just  reciprocity is an idea  that is not prevalent  in one's thinking 
until attainment of Stage  5,   and  that  the instrumental view of recip- 
rocal relations must be reached and  surpassed before the higher  ideal 
of just reciprocity can be comprehended. 
Piaget purports that  the transition from the heteronomous stage 
to the autonomous stage may occur through any of  innumerable inter- 
mediate stages.     It is the writer's belief that thinking characteristic 
of Kohlberg's Stages 2 and  3  is probably comparable to that of Piaget's 
vaguely described  intermediate stages,   at which  the child  is not only 
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concerned with maintaining  the rules and meeting the expectations of 
others,  but  is also beginning to actually believe in these standards 
to the extent of maintaining  them in the absence of adult control. 
Thus,   the prototypical person at Stage 3 adopts the role of peace- 
maker and relies heavily on stereotyped   images of the "nice" and 
"not-nice."    He  is  the one who smoothes things over  in his own 
effort  to be "nice,"   following  the inclination to please and gain 
approval.     It   seems  likely that  the person at Kohlberg's Stage 2 or 
3 is moving forward  in transition as Piaget would presume,  his skills 
and knowlelge becoming more integrated and differentiated,   ready  to 
be applied in an original way. 
Consequently,   Kohlberg's Stage 4 appears to be most comparable 
to the autonomous  stage Piaget describes,   in which  subjective re- 
sponsibility is a predominant  factor  in moral  thinking,   for  it is 
in the person who  is highly oriented  to  legal equality and  fairness 
that consideration of intention is given most regard.     In addition, 
the main consideration of a person at Stage 4 is that justice be done 
according  to the  law,   so as to maintain the existing social system. 
Violation of these  laws occurs in degrees and  ideally is never judged 
without a fair  representation of all the facts.     Orientation to Stage 
4 guarantees consideration of intention,   because of the provision  for 
this factor in the American democratic justice system.     Knowledge of 
intention does not necessarily predict the decision, however,  because 
of the  foremost orientation of Stage 4 to the law,   its rewards,  and  its 
penalities which are designed  to protect and maintain the existing social 
system.     A person functioning at this moral  stage is very likely to 
39 
agree that good  Intention must be considered,  but  is quick to ask, 
"What if everyone did it?" 
The principled  stages of Kohlberg's hierarchy incorporate  those 
highest ethical principles of justice,  reciprocity,  and  equality  in 
their    purest  forms.     Only at these stages,   according   to Kohlberg, 
can those noblest moral rights and values identified by Piaget pre- 
dominate in moral thinking.     Clearly,   it  is only at  the most advanced 
developmental   level,   cognitively and morally,   that man can transcend 
the legal and  social   limitations of his environment to comprehend   these 
values as principles  themselves.     Herein  lies the  essence of autonomous 
thinking, which has been recognized   and agreed upon by both Piaget  and 
Kohlberg. 
Newest  Developments by  Kohlberg 
A further development  in Kohlberg's theory has centered around 
the postulation of adulthood   stages.     Kohlberg and Turiel   (1971) have 
theorized   the possible existence of moral  stages in adulthood which 
have cognitive-structural components.    Although Kohlberg claims that 
these adulthood  stages do not represent a new or higher   logical stage, 
this represents a point of departure  from Piaget's cognitive develop- 
mental  theory.     The only adulthood development mentioned by Piaget  is 
a continuing development of  the cognitive process  in such cases as   (a) 
the slow developer, who may not reach  full formal operations until 
early adulthood;   (b)  those who operate at the  formal  level and whose 
continuing development  brings about a "horizontal decalage" of formal 
thought,  or an extension of application in other spheres of experience; 
and  (c)   those for whom continuing development brings about  the 
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"stabilization"  of formal  thought, which necessitates the increased 
subordination or  rejection of lower  forms of thought   (Kohlberg and 
Turiel,   1971). 
Kohlberg,   on the other hand,   suggests that there is a good 
probability of moral  stage advancement,  since the crises or turning 
points of adulthood     identity are often of a moral nature.     Increased 
experiences of personal  interchange may serve as the necessary stim- 
uli  for  transformation of moral  ideologies.    Moral development,  of 
necessity,   involves social role-taking and equilibration of role- 
taking  in the  form of reversible justice  structures.    Kohlberg clearly 
recognizes the  influence of  social and role-taking experiences on 
developmental  advancement,   as does Piaget   (1952). 
Thus,  Kohlberg postulates  the existence of a seventh stage of 
moral development, which,   true to the developmental approach,  can be 
attained only after each of  the six former stages has been mastered. 
State 7  encompasses a vague,   theoretical orientation to the ethical 
principles of Stage 6,   and  a resulting philosophy of life.    Arriving 
at an adequate philosophy of  life,  according to Kohlberg,   is a religious 
task,   in the broadest  sense of the  term,  culminating in the ultimate 
facing of cosmic  infinity and personal  finiteness.     This necessitates 
not only a postconventional orientation to universal human ethical 
principles,  but also a postconventional religious orientation which 
attempts  to answer  the ultimate of all moral questions,  "Why be moral?" 
Perhaps such questioning and  searching  cannot be resolved  by  logical 
or rational reasoning alone,   entailing as it does,   such philosophic 
questions as "Why live?"  and "How face death?"     In Kohlberg's terms, 
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The characteristics of all  these Stage 7  solutions  is that 
they  involve contemplative experiences of non-egoistic or 
non-dualistic variety.   .   .   . (That which  is)  essential  is 
the  sense of being a part of the whole of life and  the 
adoption of a cosmic,   as opposed  to a universal humanistic 
(Stage 6) perspective   (Kohlberg  and Turiel,   1971,  p.   55). 
Such a cosmic perspective requires a shift  from figure to 
ground,   such that one sees himself  from and identifies himself with 
the cosmic or  infinite perspective.     Not  surprisingly,   a sense of 
despair accompanies  the beginning of a cosmic perspective,  as one 
considers  the meaninglessness of  life in the face of death,   then 
weighs it  against   the  timeless nature of  the cosmos.     Finally, when 
one experiences a  sense of unity with nature,  of being one part of 
that whole,   a  sense of conviction emerges which "reveals the positive 
validity of the cosmic perspective  implicit in the felt despair 
(Kohlberg & Turiel,   1971,   p.   57)."   This conviction is a highly per- 
sonal and   individualized philosophy,   representing no single universal 
ontological religious  structure,   since underlying  cognitive structures 
are multiform. 
Kohlberg admits  that  the   logical structure of Stage 7 is vague 
and  that  its philosophical adequacy is hard  to justify.     In the longi- 
tudinal follow-up  study of his own original research subjects,  the 
concerns of  ideas necessary  for anything  like a Stage 7 orientation 
were absent,   even  in those  subjects reaching clearly principled think- 
ing at young ages   (Kohlberg & Kramer,   1969).     Kohlberg's approach  to 
Stage 7,   then,   is  through the back door,   supported mainly by the logic 
that there is no reason to stop developing morally at Stage 6. 
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Research Emanating  from Kohlberg's Theory 
In the sixteen years  since Kohlberg's original research with 
suburban Chicago children,  his moral development theory has stimu- 
lated much new research,  not  the  least of which was Kramer's follow- 
up study of the 72  adolescent boys that Kohlberg interviewed  in 1958 
(Kohlberg    &    Kramer,   1969).     Retesting the same subjects at intervals 
until each reached  the age of 25 years,  Kramer was able to discern 
generally the ages of transition in terms of  levels of moral develop- 
ment.     Transition from the preconventional  level   (Stages  1 and 2)   to 
the conventional   (Stages 3 and 4)  appeared   to come no  later  than the 
twelfth  or thirteenth year,  with the principled  level   (Stages 5 and 6) 
if evident at all,   appearing  in late adolescence.    A person thinking 
purely in Stage 6 was rare;  most subjects fell heavily in the conven- 
tional  level category.    After high  school,   the majority of Kramer's 
subjects stablized  at Stages 3 and 4,  although 25% of those who went 
on to college exhibited  Stage 5 thinking as young adults.     It  is im- 
portant  to note,   at   this point,  that more recent Kohlberg researchers 
have noted a great  scarcity in Stage 6,  5,  and  even Stage 4 thinking 
among most population samples   (Kohlberg,   summer workshop,   1974).     The 
discrepancy is accounted  for by measurement error and continuous re- 
vision of  the  theory and  scoring methods used by the interviewers. 
However,  Kohlberg associates are currently attempting  to define age 
norms  for moral  stage development through cross-sectional research with 
junior and  senior high school  students  (Kohlberg,   summer workshop,   1974). 
The most  significant finding  from Kramer's research was the dis- 
covery of what  appeared  to be a retrogressive step in the developmental 
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process.     Each of the  subjects who ultimately reached Stage 5  thinking 
after college,   experienced a drop  in moral maturity scores  from Stage 
4 sometime between the  last year  in high school and  the  second  or 
third year  in college.     The subjects appeared  to be operating on a 
lower or more immature  level of moral thinking,  which was extremely 
relativistic and closely resembled  the hedonistic and  instrumental 
thinking characteristic of Stage 2.   However,  by age 25,  each retrogressor 
had repossessed his  former orientation to Stage 4 and even showed 
some Stage 5 structure in his reasoning.     Kohlberg and Kramer con- 
cluded  that the regression was functional rather than structural, 
since the  former  structures of Stage 4 were not actually lost by any 
subject.     Later  three  fundamental differences between the Stage 2 
person and   the "retrogressor" were identified   (Kohlberg & Turiel, 
1973): 
1. (a)    The Stage 2 person claims relativity of all values except 
his own. 
(b)    The retrogressor denies any values,   claiming that all 
values are relative. 
2. (a)     The Stage 2 person does not distinguish rights and duties 
from his own wishes and desires, 
(b)    The retrogressor is aware of rights and duties as distinct 
from his own wishes. 
3. (a)     The Stage 2 person   has only a personal point of view 
or point of reference, 
(b)    The retrogressor has much more of a Stage 4 social perspec- 
tive or point of view. 
This retrogressive period has thus been defined as a  transition 
stage spanning  the gap  between full conventional   (Stages 3 and 4)  and 
full postconventional   (Stages 5 and  6)  thinking,  and has been labeled 
Stage    4  1/2 or 4B.     Surprisingly,  Stage 4B has not been accounted  for 
in the  latest  scoring guide to the Moral Judgment   Interview,  reportedly 
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because it is not a true stage of the developmental process  in the 
same sense as are the other  full stages   (Kohlberg,   summer workshop, 
1974). 
The existence of a transition stage, however,   is a signifi- 
cant discovery that has prompted great  interest  in adolescence on 
the part of Kohlberg.    Attempting  to explain the phenomenon of trans- 
ition,  he again returns to an examination of the parallel relations 
of cognitive and  moral developmental stages.    According  to Kohlberg, 
once  formal cognitive operations have stabilized,  given the necessary 
social and environmental  stimuli,   conventional moral reasoning begins 
to take on an arbitrary or  relativistic hue.     This relativistic skep- 
ticism is an ethical  skepticism,   transcending the social  identification 
principles of Stage 4.     Universal moral principles are not yet  clearly 
understood  or identified,  although  there may be a vague awareness of 
their existence.     It follows that persons,  probably adolescents,  going 
through  this  transition period, would be fairly non-committal  toward 
these principles.     Hypothesizing that persons  in transition are probably 
trying to  solve an identity crisis also,  Kohlberg contends that arrival 
at an adequate philosophy of  life becomes  increasingly important at   this 
point,   to the extent  that  it  takes on the characteristics of a "develop- 
mental task."   Its only solution is the  formation of a universal prin- 
cipled  morality. 
More recent research has revealed  some differences in the  transi- 
tional person studied by Kramer  from 1958-1968 and  the contemporary adoles- 
cent undergoing  transition to postconventional  thinking.     The extreme 
relativism and doubt typical of the crisis era now appears both 
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earlier and much more pervasively in college students.     Podd also 
found  a difference  in orientation in his contemporary transitional 
subjects  (Kohlberg & Gilligan,   1973).     Rather  than being  in a state 
of identity crisis, with only vague  and uncertain commitments,   his 
subjects appeared   to be in a  state of identity diffusion, with no 
sense of commitment.     In effect,  Podd  found  the transition period 
to be not  so much a  temporary developmental  stage as a more stable, 
less crisis-like  stage of  low commitment. 
Kohlberg has reasoned  that these differences are likely due to 
the growth of a popular and  profitable "counterculture" which preaches 
a "new morality,"   often pressuring the adolescent to be a philosopher 
before he is ready for  it.     It seems realistic to surmise that much 
of the  identity diffusion and consequent dilemma-type feelings which 
plague adolescents may be the result of being faced with resolutions 
before  the problems are yet realized.     The pressure of the counter- 
culture to accept half-answers before one even begins to question 
can hardly be expected not  to affect  the natural progression of moral 
thinking. 
In an aside,   Kohlberg has formulated his own analysis of the 
"counterculture"  and  its "new morality."    While preaching the rejec- 
tion of conventional morality,   the counterculture advocates adopting 
a new philosophy which appears to be postconventional,  yet really is 
a mixture of  preconventional Stage 2 "do    your own thing"   and Stage 
3 "be nice,  be  loving"   themes.     Thus the "new morality" actually con- 
stitutes another conventional system,  complete with stereotypes,   norms, 
and unwritten codes of conduct. 
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Since Kohlberg's  theory has become known,  different aspects 
of its structure have been challenged and  studied  in depth.     One of 
the most noted  studies of this type was undertaken by Rest   (1968) who 
investigated   the claim of stage hierarchy;   that  is,   that each stage 
is structurally more differentiated and   integrated  than the  stage pre- 
ceding  it,   rather  than being a mere extension of the principles of 
the lower  stage.     Assuming the hierarchy to be a valid construct,  Rest 
worked  from the hypothesis  that attainment of a given stage,   as ascer- 
tained  by the Kohlberg Moral Judgment   Interview, would determine one's 
comprehension of  the other moral development stages;   specifically,  one 
would be able to comprehend   the principles of his given stage,  as well 
as those principles constituting any stage below his own,   since they 
have already been organized and   integrated within the current higher 
stage.     Conversely,   comprehension of higher stage principles would be 
difficult,   since  the reasoning process characteristic of these stages 
has not yet been attained. 
Awaiting a  time  lapse of six months after giving 47 senior 
high school  students  the Kohlberg  interview,  Rest presented   this 
subject  sample with  two sets of six prototypical statements,   each 
representing one of  the six stages of moral thinking.    Each  subject 
was asked   to discuss  these statements,  which were responses to two of 
the original nine dilemma situations  in the Kohlberg   interview,  and to 
compare the  statements with his own view.     Comprehension scores were ob- 
tained  from these recapitulations.     Subjects were then asked  to rate each 
statement on a five-point scale,   ranging from very poor to very good, 
and  to rank order the statements according  to preference. 
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A  comparison of comprehension scores obtained  from the struc- 
tured-response   instrument with the stage scores ascertained  through 
spontaneous usage in response to Kohlberg's interview,   showed a close 
relationship between the two sets of scores.    More significantly, 
Rest  found   that  subjects correctly interpreted   the principles upon 
which  statements representing their own or  lower stages were based, 
but  few subjects were able to recapitulate higher  stage statements 
without reconstructing them to be characteristic of their own  lower 
stages. 
Some persons were able to comprehend  statements representing 
thinking one stage higher  than their own spontaneous stage ascertained 
through the  interview.     Therefore,   Rest  surmised  that operation at a 
certain stage of moral thinking did not  limit comprehension to that 
stage.     In fact,   there was considerable evidence that many persons 
did understand one stage higher   (+1)   thinking than they used routinely. 
Evidence for comprehension of thinking higher than one stage above  (+2 
or higher)   the operational stage was  scarce.     Those whose comprehension 
level was higher  than their functional   level,   for the most part, were 
shown to have used a substantial number of higher  stage statements 
spontaneously in  the pretest  interview. 
From  the rating and  ranking data,  however,   Rest found  that 
subjects consistently chose higher stage statements as the "best" 
responses,   even those who did not understand  the principles upon 
which the statements were based.     Ranking was generally in an inverted 
stage order,   beginning with Stage    6    statements and proceeding  systema- 
tically down to Stage     1    statements. 
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Rest's  study added considerable support  to the theoretical  con- 
struct of a stage hierarchy,  but  it also added  an insight  into the 
nature of  the decision-making process.     It appears that a  structured- 
response  instrument may yield biased  scores if used to determine  in- 
dividual moral  stages  through the process of selection of most adequate 
response.     Rest  indicated that highest  stage statements were chosen be- 
cause of their noble-sounding principles and ideas, which appeal to 
most people,   even though  they may not understand   those ideas. 
Another study   (Turiel,   1969) was designed  to test  two develop- 
mental hypotheses upon which Kohlberg's typology is based: 
1. The six moral stages  form an invariant sequence. 
2. The movement  from one  stage to the next  is a restructuring 
and displacement of the preceding  stage. 
A sample of children was administered  a pretest containing six situa- 
tions from Kohlberg's  interview.     The subjects'   stages were determined 
and  those in Stages 2,   3,  and 4 were retained for  the remainder of  the 
experiment.     An experimental treatment,  embodying exposure to new 
moral concepts,  was administered  two weeks after the pretest  to all 
but a group of control subjects.     One group of subjects was exposed 
to the  stage directly above its own  (fl),  a second group was exposed  to 
two stages above its own  (f2),   and a third group was exposed  to the 
stage directly below its own (-1). 
To assess  the  influence of the treatment,  all  subjects were ad- 
ministered a posttest which included  the six situations of the pretest 
and the three  that were used  in the experimental  treatment.     The change 
in the scores of  the pre- and posttests showed that  there was signifi- 
cantly more use made of the+1  thinking than either  the -1 or-f 2 modes 
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of  thinking   (p'C.Ol).     Turiel concluded  from these results that one 
cannot  skip a  stage,   and  that when exposed to new moral concepts, he 
can assimilate only those that are one  stage above his own level. 
The hypothesis  that the six moral stages form an invariant sequence 
was thus supported.     The hypothesis that movement  from one  stage to 
the next is a restructuring and displacement of the preceding stage 
was also supported by  the subjects*   failure to accept -1 thinking,  a 
stage that had been replaced by higher modes of thought although  it 
may have been more easily understood  than the higher modes of think- 
ing   (Turiel,   1969). 
Another  significant  study yielding data which  supported  the 
results  found by Turiel and Rest was that of Blatt   (Blatt & Kohlberg, 
1973), who designed a  two-study program intended  to raise  the moral 
thinking of pre-adolescent and adolescent children via cognitive con- 
flict and  stimulation of higher stage thinking.    Working with two ex- 
perimental samples,  Blatt pursued this objective through organized, 
systematic arguments challenging present-stage  thinking,  and overt, 
verbal persuasions advocating higher stage responsep.     The dilemma 
situations used   to stimulate discussion were appropriately related 
to the two different population samples.     Study  I,  which was actually 
a pilot  study, was carried out  in a Sunday school group of  11 upper- 
middle class Jewish children,  aged  11 to 12 years,  and used Biblical 
moral dilemma situations.     The population sample used   for Study  II 
was a heterogeneous group of 132  sixth and  tenth graders from four 
suburban Chicago public  schools.    New dilemma situations involving 
conflict with nine of Kohlberg's twelve moral  issues were used with 
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the public  school sample.     Study   II had   two experimental groups,  Ex- 
periment   I,  which was   led by Blatt  in the discussion procedure des- 
cribed above,  and Experiment  II, which was allowed to discuss  the same 
moral dilemma  situations,  but without benefit of adult guidance,  during 
the time  that  the researcher was meeting with Experiment   I.     The con- 
trol group maintained  their regular classroom activities during  the 
discussion time.     The entire program of Study  II was carried out within 
the classroom setting. 
The design of  the program was comparable  to the one described 
by Turiel   (1969)   and,   like Turiel,  Blatt,  using  the Kohlberg Moral 
Judgment  Interview,   found  significant increases in+1   (stage)   thinking 
at  the posttest,   as compared  to pretest  scores,   in the Study  I group 
and  in the  Experiment   I group of Study  II,  both of which he  led.    This 
change in moral  thinking appeared  to be of a structural,  developmental 
nature,   since  the  increase was relative  to each child's  functioning 
stage,  and was usually to the next  stage up,  although each child was 
exposed  to  the same stimuli   (responses varying from Stage 2  to Stage 
6)  and  thus was amply exposed to wide-range modeling of different  levels 
of thought. 
In contrast  to Rest   (1968), who found  that persons advancing  to 
1 thinking on the posttest were already spontaneously using + 1  thinking 
at  least 20% of  the  time,    Blatt  found  that  those in his  sample who 
showed a  low frequency  (under 207.) of    1 thinking on the pretest were 
those who displayed  the  clearest  increase in + 1 thinking on the post- 
test.     Those  showing clear pretest usage of-M  thinking showed   little 
or no clear   increase   (47. or  less)   in * 1 thinking on the posttest. 
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Blatt concluded   that his classroom discussions  led   to the actual 
formation of a higher  stage of thought,   from the ground up,  as opposed 
to Rest,  whose   findings  suggested  that simple passive exposure  to-f 1 
thinking was  sufficient  to complete  transition to the next highest 
moral stage. 
Of equal  importance was Blatt's finding that of those who did 
move up one stage on the post Lest,   all maintained this advanced  stage 
on the follow-up  test,  both of which included   the same situations as 
the pretest,   and  two new situational dilemmas.     Thus the results indi- 
cated that  the developmental gains  in moral  thinking were not only 
stable over  time,  but that they also generalized  to new verbal situa- 
tions. 
Aside  from the data supportive of stage hierarchy construct, 
Blatt discovered  a phenomenon not consistent with developmental  theory: 
stage-skipping.     In both  the Study  I group and   in Experiment   I of 
Study   II,   some  subjects who were scored as operating at Stage 2 or be- 
tween Stages 2  and 3 on the pretest were scored as operating at Stage 
4 on the posttest,  apparently skipping any stabilization at Stage 3 
entirely.     Blatt posited a number of plausible explanations for  this 
rarity,  but  finally concluded  that  stage-skipping was due to measure- 
ment error.     Indeed,  when a  follow-up test was given a year  later, 
each stage-skipper had returned either to his original stage or  to 
the next highest  Stage 3.     It  is important to note at  this    point  that 
Kohlberg currently maintains that any stage-skipping  found  in interviewed 
subjects is generally an error on the part of the scorer.     Kohlberg bases 
his assumption entirely on the theoretical constructs of stage hierarchy 
and invariant sequence of developmental progression. 
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Moral  Education 
The results reported by these studies indicate a most  important 
consideration for  the direction of future moral research:     the possi- 
bility of induced  change  in moral development.    Blatt's study has 
yielded   strong empirical support   for the possibility of developmental 
advancement which  is stable over  time and which promises  to be gen- 
eralized   to other verbal  situations.    Thus,  Kohlberg and Turlel have 
become recent and   strong crusaders  for moral education programs in 
public  schools   (Kohlberg and Turiel,   1971).     Insisting  that moral 
principles themselves cannot be taught as such,   the researchers claim 
the  true goal of moral education ultimately to be facilitation of the 
child's own natural development into the higher stages of moral think- 
ing,rather than indoctrination in programs designed  to internalize within 
the child   the arbitrary and fixed  conventions of social  institutions. 
Traditionally,   the approach   to moral education in American schools 
has been in the  form of character education, generally stressing the 
acquisition of virtuous habits and given to sermonizing.     A current 
trend  in many schools  is the value-clarification approach, which 
skirts the ominous danger inherent  in indoctrination.     Seeking to 
avoid  inculcating  the child  in any one value system and at the same 
time trying to protect  the right of each child to determine for him- 
self the value system by which he will  live,  educators have stressed 
cultural and value relativity,   and  tolerance of those value systems 
which are different  from one's own.     However,   in this noble effort 
to avoid   indoctrination,  the  important task of helping children 
recognize those values of universal validity has been neglected or 
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overlooked.    Although acknowledging that value-clarification is a 
useful  component of moral education,  Kohlberg maintains that it is 
insufficient by itself in accomplishing moral maturity in individuals. 
Another approach has  followed  the main points of Durkheim's 
philosophy:     respect   for majority rule and  consensus;   community values 
are to be respected because they are agreed upon by society.     Still 
others have abandoned moral education altogether in favor of pro- 
moting mental health. 
Kohlberg and Turiel  see their approach to moral education as 
being free  from indoctrination and geared  toward helping  the  child 
reach his full moral,  philosophical potential.     Besides the   support 
of accumulating evidence that higher  stage  stabilization is more 
predictive of ethical behavior than is  lower  stage stabilization, 
the authors believe there are a number of other valid reasons for 
the adequacy of their  approach   (Kohlberg and Turiel,   1971).     In 
their  terms,  moral  education through stimulation of natural develop- 
mental progression   (a)   is based not on social authority, but upon 
natural authority of the most advanced  stage;   (b)  is not an imposi- 
tion of the  thinking of an elite group of "moral experts"   since 
structure does not predict content of moral  thinking;   (c)  is not a 
private belief system like religion;   it  is the teaching of justice, 
which  is not a violation of individual rights;   it is,   in fact, 
oriented  to the preservation and  transmission of individual  rights; 
(d)   leads  to development of  the principles of justice, which are  in- 
consistent with prejudiced actions;   and   (e)  represents universal 
moral principles which are defined   independently of one's needs, 
54 
personal attachments,  or customs and  laws.    Kohlberg and Turiel are 
also convinced  of the adequacy of their approach over the popular be- 
havioral approach of behavior modification, which is oriented  to the 
changing of overt  behavior and  the application of technique  irrespec- 
tive of motives causing  the behavior.     Immediate behavioral change 
is not a valid  criterion of effective moral education,   since content 
of moral thinking   is distinctly different   from the underlying struc- 
ture which determines how one thinks about a moral   situation.     Finally, 
the authors  claim  that  the  fundamental defect  of focusing directly 
upon "good behavior," referring to the behavioral principle of positive 
reinforcement,   is  that  the definition of such a notion may be relative 
only to the   standards and biases of  the teacher or  judge.     Furthermore, 
it does not directly lead  to the development of moral fortitude,  nor 
does it  seem to have  long-range or general positive effects. 
The  steps basic to an implementation of the developmental ap- 
proach in moral  education,  according  to Kohlberg and Turiel are these: 
(a)'be aware of  the child's current position in the stage hierarchy 
and his  functioning stage;   (b) match  the child's level by communi- 
cating at a  stage directly above his own  (these  first  two steps are 
directly comparable  to Piagetian ideas on cognitive  stimulation and 
development  and  the "problem of the fflatch"   as cited by J. McV.   Hunt 
in Ojemann & Pritchett,   1966);   (c)   focus on reasoning rather than on 
content of the child's decisions;   and   (d) help the child  experience the 
type of conflict  that   leads  to an awareness of the greater adequacy of 
the next highest  stage. 
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Kohlberg and others agree  that the great need now in moral 
education is  the determination of optimal conditions for change; 
a rational  approach  to moral education is  thought to be one of  the 
most  important  areas  for  the  improvement of public education. 
Conclusions and   Suggestions  for Research 
Much  interest and a great deal of research in moral reason- 
ing has been generated by Kohlberg's  theory of developmental moral 
stages.     Various constructs of the theory have been supported by 
other  researchers,   and much effort has been given to the formulation 
of a workable,   non-indoctrinating program of moral education. 
Further  research,   however,   is needed  in several areas of moral 
development which have been either overlooked or by-passed  in favor 
of another  interest.     Some areas have been recently recognized as 
promising of  significant   insights  into the developmental process. 
Ideas for  future  researchers have been evident  in much of the literature. 
An investigation of factors other than age which may affect the 
development of moral reasoning  is needed.    Although Kohlberg has been 
thorough  in attempts  to validate his theory through cross-cultural re- 
search,  he has based moral  stage norms  for American youth primarily 
on interviewings  of children and adolescents in major cities in mid- 
western and northeastern areas of the United  States.     Persons in 
other   locales such as  the politically and philosophically conservative 
areas and  small-town areas of the United States should be  interviewed 
for comparison.     In addition,   the influence of such factors as social 
class,  personal value systems,   and emotional security on rate of moral 
development has not been ascertained. 
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Important different age-groups have also been neglected as 
potential  sources of new information.    Very little research has been 
done with    young  children,  especially with  those under  five years of 
age,  presumably because of the difficulty of conveying a moral dilemma 
to those who are  quite  immature cognitively.     Investigation of this 
age-group requires  the development of new techniques for presentation 
of dilemma  situations,   such as slides,   filmstrips,  records,  role play 
with dolls,  or other concrete means of communication. 
The possibility of stages  in adulthood  should be researched. 
Longitudinal  studies are needed  to determine existence of and move- 
ment  into  these  stages.    Middle- and older-aged groups  should be 
interviewed   for  insight  into the nature of Stage 7. 
The discovery of a transition period between stabilized con- 
ventional thinking  and principled   thinking has raised  several ques- 
tions about developmental theory.     Does the transition period ever 
indicate true,   structural regression?     How do social conditions  in- 
fluence  the nature of this phenomenon? 
Stage-skipping has also been found by other researchers  (Blatt 
6. Kohlberg,   1973),  which Kohlberg contends is not  consistent with 
developmental  theory and is therefore due to measurement error.     Re- 
search  is needed  to determine the  significance of  stage-skipping and 
whether it may be due to individual or sltuational factors,  rather 
than to judgment error on the part of the scorer. 
Another question of major importance for researchers is that 
of the relationship between functioning moral  stage and moral behavior. 
Although Kohlberg bases a part of his claim for moral education on 
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certain studies which have shown higher moral stages to be predictive 
of consistent,   ethical actions   (Kohlberg & Turiel,   1971),   concentrated 
research efforts  in this area are unfortunately lacking. 
A final  researchable area  involves  the framework of Kohlberg's 
proposed program of moral education.    One of  the most notable gaps 
in Kohlberg's approach  is the lack of  identification of specific en- 
vironmental  factors which may initiate or support advancement in moral 
reasoning.     Determination of critical  factors which promote or perhaps 
maintain principled  thinking is a necessary prerequisite for successful 
moral education. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURE 
Although the present  research study was originally oriented 
toward  the validation of one written,  convenient,  objective adapta- 
tion of the Kohlberg Moral Judgment  Interview,   the design was modi- 
fied  to include the comparison of two written instruments,  one objec- 
tive and   structured,   the other  subjective and unstructured,  both 
closely resembling Kohlberg's oral procedure  in composition and  in 
yielding of  scores. 
An objective  instrument was designed using moral dilemma 
situations  from Kohlberg's   (1958)  original  interviewing technique 
reported  in his doctoral dissertation.     Each dilemma situation was 
followed by questions also designed by Kohlberg to prompt  the solving 
of the dilemma. 
For each question,   six alternative solutions were constructed, 
each representing the  thinking that  is characteristic of one of the 
six moral stages.     Each of  the six alternatives was derived directly 
from prototypical responses recorded by Kohlberg whenever possible; 
for those stages not represented  in his scoring appendix  (predominantly 
Stages 5 and  6),   appropriate characteristic responses were devised 
according to Kohlberg's definitions of those stages. 
Because   the revised Kohlberg Moral Judgment   Interview was not 
available for  the pilot  study to compare with  the objective  test,  a 
written open-end version of the interview was developed which closely 
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approximated   the  interview in individual scores of moral development. 
The decision to compare  the two instruments, with  the hope of validating 
at least one,  was  the result of data analyzed  from several pilot  studies, 
in which it appeared  that open-end questions allowing for unstructured, 
spontaneous  solutions,  revealed moral thinking which was consistent,   to 
a considerable degree,  with prototypical reasoning reported by Kohlberg. 
A succession of pilot  studies was done in order to revise the 
objective instrument's alternative choices,   so that they were as similar 
as possible  to current prototypical  responses found by the researcher 
through  the  comparable open-end instrument.     The first pilot  test  in- 
cluded a non-random  sampling of approximately 50 college subjects, 
ranging  from sophomores  to graduate  students, who were  systematically 
randomized  into two subgroups.     Each subgroup was  then asked  to complete 
one of  the two questionnaires,   each of which was composed of only two 
of Kohlberg's original nine moral dilemma situations and  six questions 
(three questions for  each  situation). 
A  second pilot study sample was a combination of two college 
freshman English classes,   who were again systematically randomized 
and asked  to complete one of the two revised  questionnaires,  each of 
which included  all nine moral dilemmas and 27 questions   (three questions 
for each of the nine dilemmas).     These instruments proved to be too 
lengthy for written answers,  and  composition of both tests was revised 
to include six selected moral dilenma situations and 12 questions   (two 
questions  for each of the  six dilemmas).    Multiple-choice answers were 
revised  to further match.current prototypical statements and to correct 
for words and/or phrases in high-stage responses which appeared  to be 
leading a majority of subjects to choose those responses. 
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The further-revised objective  instrument with  the multiple- 
choice responses was then given to a  small class of graduate students 
for  individual evaluations of reading complexity, and   identification 
of leading or  too-obvious words or phrases which appeared  to indicate 
the "best"  answer.     Results  from these evaluations were  influential 
in the final revision of  the  two written instruments. 
Thus,   the completed  research  instruments which were used   in 
the present study each contained  six moral dilemma situations and 
twelve questions   (See Appendix).    The two questions which  followed 
each  situation were designed  to probe two of the several vaguely- 
defined moral  aspects recorded  in Kohlberg's original research:     (a) 
personal values and   (b)   justice.    Directions attached to the front of 
the objective  test  instructed  subjects to record  selected  structural 
reponses by printing  the corresponding  letter   (A, B,  C, D,  E or F)  of 
those responses  in the appropriate space provided on a  separate answer 
sheet.    Directions attached  to the open-end  instrument  instructed  sub- 
jects  to write  in their own answer to each question in the space pro- 
vided on the test. 
Because validation    of either  instrument necessarily required 
the distinguishing of age-group differences in scores   (according to 
percentage distributions of moral thinking at comparable ages recorded 
by Kohlberg   (1963)  and his compelling argument of the parallel relation- 
ship of moral and cognitive stages   (Kohlberg & Gilligan,   1973),  at  least 
two different age groups were needed   for testing of  the  instruments. 
Children in seventh and  twelfth grades were  thought  to be most likely 
to reflect cognitive  stage differences and   thus,  moral stage differences. 
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Availability of college students prompted their inclusion in the 
population sample, also. Thus, the research design involved the 
testing of two instruments with  three different age-groups. 
One public school  system agreed  to provide two seventh grade 
classes and  two twelfth grade classes as subjects,  after a personal 
visit was made  to the office of school officials which  included 
verbal explanations of  the research design and  its purpose,  and  a 
presentation of the research instruments.    This same procedure had 
been followed   in approaching the two other school systems which 
denied  the use of their  students,  probably because the questionnaire 
involved moral decisions. 
The  total population of subjects included a non-random sampling 
of 61  twelfth-graders,   57  seventh-graders,  and  50 college students. 
The two younger age-groups attended public,  consolidated  junior and 
senior high  schools,   respectively, which were  located  in a small southern 
city.     These  students were bussed  from surrounding urban and rural com- 
munities to the city schools,  and were heterogeneous in social class, 
race,  and  intellectual ability.     The two classes each of 6eventh- and 
twelfth-graders were selected by the respective principals,  according 
to the heterogeneous requirement  imposed by the researcher and accord- 
ing to teachers'   convenience. 
The college sample was composed of 50 non-randomly selected 
students who were predominantly freshmen and sophomores.    A total of 
143 college  students were tested,  but only 50 of  those were randomly 
selected  for analysis and comparison in the present study.    The subjects 
were predominantly white and  female;   all were enrolled  in an introductory 
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family development  course at  a southern,  state-supported university. 
It is assumed   that,   on the average,   the socio-economic background for 
this age-group was  slightly higher  than that of  the younger, public 
school age-groups. 
It  is  important  to note that the college  subjects were the 
only group  to whom both  tests were given.     Thus matched pairs of 
scores on the two  tests were obtained only for this group. 
Testing of the college age-group was done according to the 
following procedure: 
1. The researcher met with two successive classes of students 
on the same day,  and  administered  the unstructured, open-end instru- 
ment.     Identical verbal explanations of directions were given to 
each class before  the marking of the questionnaires.    The researcher 
remained with each class during the 50-minute periods allowed for 
answering  the questionnaire.     Clarification of directions or questions 
was given throughout  the testing as students asked, but great care was 
taken to refrain from disclosing the nature of the research. 
2. A time-lapse of three weeks was  imposed. 
3. The researcher met with the  successive classes again three 
weeks after giving  the open-end  test,  and administered the  structured, 
objective  test.     Identical verbal explanations of directions were given 
to each group.     The researcher remained with  the groups during the  50- 
minute periods of allotted  time for completing the  instrument,  taking 
care not to disclose  the nature of the research while answering ques- 
tions of procedure.     On the average,   students completed  the objective 
instrument  in less time  than  they completed  the open-end test. 
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Tests were coded  by number,   so as  to ensure corresponding 
matched pairs of scores. 
Testing of  the  118 seventh- and twelfth-graders followed  this 
procedure: 
1. The researcher met with both age-groups  the same morning, 
in successive order:     twelfth-graders were tested  from 8:40  to 9:40 
a.m.,   seventh-graders  from  10:10 to 11:10 a.m. 
2. A  10-rainute verbal  explanation describing the tests as 
opinionnaires was given to each age-group.     The nature of the tests 
was not disclosed.     Subjects  then systematically randomized   themselves 
by verbally ordering  themselves by number.     Odd numbered  subjects were 
given the open-end   instrument;  even-numbered  subjects were given the 
objective  test. 
3. Each age group was allowed 50 minutes to complete the question- 
naires.    The experimenter remained in the room with both age-groups 
during  the testing periods in order to clarify questions of the subjects. 
4. Two receptacles were placed on auxiliary tables  in each room for 
deposit of completed   tests,   face-down. 
5. Subjects who completed the instruments before the 50 minutes were 
over were asked   to read or sit quietly at their seats so that   there was 
no reward  for  finishing early.     (The majority of twelfth-graders finished 
in 30-35 minutes,   but most  seventh-graders required approximately ten 
minutes  longer.     In most cases,  subjects answering the objective  instru- 
ment finished  ahead of those answering  the open-end  test.    At  the end 
of the  testing periods,   the experimenter personally retrieved papers 
from those few subjects in each group who were still working.) 
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6.     Because of  interests expressed by the principals,  each age- 
group was asked  to write comments on the back of the test as to ease 
in reading and  comprehension.     (Resulting comments indicated  the 
seniors were  thinking qualitatively about the instruments,  as the 
tone of their comments was generally of a judgmental nature;   i.e., "The 
test was very good   ...   it made me think"  or "The test was  stupid   .   .   . 
irrelevant."     Seventh-graders tended  to respond  in terms of ability 
to perform and understand   the stories and questions;   i.e., "I un- 
derstood  the test  .   .   .   could read  it"  or "I didn't understand  it 
.   .   . didn't know what   to write  .   .   .   ." 
Scoring the Research  Instruments 
Scoring of the open-end   instrument was based as closely as pos- 
sible on the procedure reported by Kohlberg for  scoring the oral 
interview  (1958).     Item scoring and global scoring was done accord- 
ing to the  following procedure: 
Item scoring 
1. The complete answer  to each question or item was read as a 
whole. 
2. Individual  ideas or  statements represented   in the answers 
were scored  according  to the  stage each represented:    prototypical 
statements appearing in the  responses were scored  first,  exactly 
according to Kohlberg's  tables of prototypical responses.     Ideas 
inherent  in the reasoning were  then scored according to moral  stage 
definitions.    After this systematic scoring of the entire response, 
a tally was made of the stages represented.    An item score was assigned 
to the response which represented the dominant  stage of thinking in the 
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response.     Dominant  stage was determined by  (a)   the  largest tally 
score,  or   (b)   in the event that two or more stages were represented 
equally in the tally,   the  scorer made the  judgment as to which  stage 
of thinking  seemed   to be strongest in the  stated  reasoning. 
Global  scoring 
1. Global scores  for each  individual were determined  through 
the tallying of  the  12   item scores and  the ascertaining of the per- 
centage of usage or representation of each stage  from the tally 
scores.     In  the event  that two or more stages were represented 
equally in the  item tally,  and  their equal percentages were also 
the highest percentages  found   (for example,   if 50% of the items 
were scored Stage 2 and  50% were scored Stage 3),   the highest  tied 
stage was recorded  as  the global score. 
2. Global  scores were  stated in terms of dominant moral stage- 
Stage  1,   2,   3,  4,   5,  or 6. 
Following is a presentation of selected responses from the 
sample protocols collected  in this research.     These responses are, 
for the most part,   classical examples of typical stage thinking. 
Three characteristic responses are given for each moral stage, one 
from each age-group.     Criteria for scoring each response are des- 
cribed after  each response. 
Stage   1.     Orientation to authority, punishment and reward. 
In answer  to Question 10,   concerning the decision to send  either 
a troublemaker or a dying man to perform a  suicidal mission in order  to 
save the rest of a company of Marines,  a  seventh-grader's typical Stage   1 
response was:   "Let   the troublemaker go.  Because he desurs   (deserves)  it. 
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Right to  life  is viewed   as indistinct  from the wishes of the one in 
authority and   is  totally dependent upon obedience of arbitrary rules. 
Death  is considered proper and  automatic punishment for someone who 
has disobeyed  the rule of cooperation. 
Accordingly,   a twelfth-grader's response to Question 3 which 
deals with the decision to allow a woman to die who is terminally 
ill,   in intense pain,  and who  is asking to die,   is:    "No,   I feel if 
God wants you to suffer he'll make you    suffer no matter how much 
painkiller you take."    Orientation to authority and  imminence of jus- 
tice  is apparent.     Right  to life again is viewed as indistinguished 
from the wishes of  the One in authority. 
A college student  elaborates further on the same question,  in 
the reasoning of Stage 1:     "...   (the doctor) would be killing her 
with drugs same as  if he would use a poison on a healthy person." 
Intention and  relevant circumstances are not considered.    Outright 
murder is not distinguished from euthanasia.    Staying alive is ulti- 
mately and categorically right, while allowing death is ultimately 
and categorically wrong. 
Stage 2.     Orientation to  instrumental hedonism. 
In answer  to Question 1,  which concerns the right of a man to 
steal a drug in order to save his wife's life, a  seventh-grader responds: 
"Yes.     Becase   (because)  his wife needed the drug  to live and the druggist 
wouldn't  let him pay the  rest   later."    Violation of the  law is justified 
by personal need and benefit  to the violator.     It  is implied  that  the 
druggist deserves  to have his drug stolen since he refused to do what 
the husband wanted   (to give him access to the drug). 
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A twelfth-grader responds at Stage 2  to the same question: 
"Yes    any in time when a person discovered  something he not going to 
think people who was dieing   (dying),   just money."    Again it  is implied 
that the druggist deserves  to have his drug stolen since he is so con- 
cerned with his own personal gain and  is unwilling to "make a deal" 
with someone who needs a share of  this gain  (the rare drug).     The 
druggist holds  to a concept  that is also characteristic of Stage 1: 
the value of property is greater  than the value of life. 
In answer  to Question 5, which asks whether an escaped  con- 
vict should be reported  even though he  is engaged  in a profitable 
business which is helping others  in several ways,   a college student 
says of the one considering whether to report the convict: 
No,   it was none of his business.     Heintz  (the escaped 
convict)  was hurting no one the worse.     He was helping 
people.     True it was begun in an  illegal manner,  but 
he and others will benefit whereas they would not if he 
were behind bars. 
Justice is seen as  simple exchange and  reciprocal action.    Reporting of 
the convict  is  judged   to be unfair since the convict has done nothing 
personally to the reporter.     Life  is seen as the possession of  the owner, 
to be manipulated as the owner wishes.     Personal gain is valued above 
justice. 
Stage 3.     Orientation to  social approval and  stereotypical concepts 
of good and bad. 
A  seventh-grader answers  in response to Question 7 which poses 
the decision of whether one Marine should be sent on a suicidal mission 
to save the rest of the company or if each man should  just try to escape 
the best he canj   "Leave nobody behind because if everyone goes every- 
one will be doing there   (their)  job and helping out the Marines." 
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The stereotype of a good Marine is prominent;   the sense of what one 
ought to do  is  the basis  for  this reasoning. 
A twelfth-grader  responds to the question of mercy-killing in 
Question 3: 
If she is  that bad with pain and  feels that  she can no 
longer stand   it,   the doctor should  consider giving her 
the small dose.     But  if she has enough faith  in God, 
she shouldn't want  to decide when her  life will end. 
The tendency  to please  is evident in the decision to compromise  the 
woman's request  for enough painkiller to effect her death;   the stereo- 
typical image of what a good person ought  to do is present and great 
value is placed on unrealistic faith  in a realistic situation. 
A college student  invokes stereotypical "oughts"  in his answer 
to the dilemma of the husband who steals in order  to save his wife's 
life in Question  1: 
No,   (he should not steal)  but actually  I don't blame him. 
The druggist  should not have made the drug's cost so high 
that  the  average person could not afford  it.     He seems very 
heartless and  insincere in his work.     He works for money 
rather to  invent a cure. 
Identification with the one of good  intention is typical of Stage 3 
thinking;   the value placed on property is  less than the value placed 
helping others,  being "nice," or doing what one ought to do. on 
Stag; .4.    Orientation  to  law and order,   and maintenance of the  status quo. 
A  seventh-grader responds to Question 9 which asks whether a 
sick man or a  troublemaker should be sent on a suicide mission:    "I think 
he (the Marine captain)  ot   (ought)   to send the troublemaker because  the 
sick man might not make it."     Concern for efficiency and getting the job 
done overrides other considerations in juding the situation.     Emphasis 
is on maintaining the present welfare of the Marine company. 
69 
In response  to Question 8,  which asks  for a judgment of the 
suggestion to draw straws as a means for selecting the Marine who 
is to carry out  the  suicide mission,   a  twelfth-grader states:    "I 
think this was  a bad  suggestion.     The captain should have stayed  to 
destroy the bridge   (the  suicide mission).     Responsibility is  something 
that should never be put aside."    Orientation to authority and the re- 
sponsibility  inherent  in it  is prominent in this reasoning:     great value 
is placed on responsibility,  which  is necessary for maintenance of the 
status quo,   i.e.,   everyone doing his duty. 
A college student responds  to the dilemma of whether  to order 
a sick man or  a  troublemaker  to go on the suicide mission in question 
9 on the basis of efficiency,   social utility,  and  rehabilitation of 
one who can still be of use  to the Marine company:    "The sick man  (should 
go) because he would weaken the crew anyway   (and) perhaps die.    Perhaps 
the troublemaker  could help   lead or  learn his  lesson." 
Stage 5.     Orientation to the principle of the greatest good  for the 
       greatest number,  and consideration of basic human rights 
and duties. 
A  seventh-grader responds to Question 7, which asks for a 
decision on whether one man's  life  should be risked  for  the rest of 
the company of Marines:     "I think he   (the captain)   should order a man 
back, because  if he   (the captain) went back the rest of the men might 
not make  it."     Recognition of  the value of many lives over the value 
of one life  is  evident;   the one who can best help the rest of  the company 
escape  (the captain,   because of his  leadership ability)   should not be 
sent on the mission,   since  this would be defeating  the purpose of saving 
as many  lives as possible. 
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A  twelfth grade student responds  to mercy-killing in Question 
3 with Stage 5  thinking:     "Yes  (the woman should be given the lethal 
dose of morphine) but only after Heintz and his wife had  talked  together 
about the matter and agreed   that that would be the best way."    The va- 
lidity of ethical principles  is based on consensus of the group or of 
relevant persons. 
In answer  to-whether an escaped convict  should be reported  even 
though he  is currently supporting the building of a badly-needed hos- 
pital in Question 3,  a college  student states:     "No-Heintz   (the escaped 
convict) has proven  to be quite a humanitarian.     If he were  sent back 
to prison,   it would be a great  loss  to the community,  or perhaps  the 
world."    Contribution to the welfare of  the community is more important 
than punishment of one who is judged  to have paid his debt  to society 
in a more useful way  than through confinement. 
Only one global score of Stage 5 was found among the entire 
population sample of  168 subjects.     The subject exhibiting predominantly 
Stage 5  thinking was a college subject. 
Stage 6.     Orientation to universal moral principles. 
Though Stage 6 responses were very rare among seventh-graders, 
one subject  in  this age-group in one  sentence demonstrated  some sense 
of the equality of  life for all men in response  to the question asking 
for valid criteria for judging whether a troublemaker or a sick man 
should be  sent on a  suicide mission in Question  10:    "The sick man al- 
ready have trouble but  just because  the other man is a troublemaker does 
not make him no different  if he was the sick man both has the right to 
live." 
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Although the cognitive functioning of this student appears to 
be at a  lower  stage than that of  formal operations, which is necessary 
for Stage 6 moral   thinking,  recognition of the concept of equality of 
life, which is evident in these comments,   is classic Stage 6 reasoning, 
and it appears in Kohlberg's prototypical  statements  illustrating Stage 
6  (Kohlberg,   1958).     Statements invoking  the principle of equality of 
life were rarely found in any age-group in the present  study. 
Consideration of  the ultimate worth of human life,   as totally dis- 
tinct from the value of all other   life forms is  the basis for a twelfth- 
grader's  thinking on the question of whether humans should be mercy- 
killed since pets are often killed  for humanitarian reasons  in Question 
4:    "A person  is a human being and  should not be  treated  like a dog 
no matter what   the  circumstances are." 
A college  student also invokes  the equalitarian principle in 
deciding the validity of drawing straws as a means for selecting  the 
man who should go on the suicide mission in  Question 8:     "Drawing  straws 
would probably be  the  fairest solution to the problem.     Everyone would 
have the  same chances for  staying behind   (going on the mission) or re- 
treating." 
Pure Stage 6  reasoning was  found very rarely in any age-group 
and  there were  no subjects in the entire population who received a 
global score of Stage 6.     However,   isolated  incidences of Stage 6 rea- 
soning did  appear  in each age-group. 
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It  is  important  to note that among most   subjects,   responses 
were  spread over  several  stages and apparent stage-skipping similar 
to that reported by Blatt  (Blatt & Kahlberg,   1973) was found.     Current 
Kohlberg researchers claim that spread of responses over as many as 
three consecutive stages  is extremely rare,  and  is probably due to 
scoring error.     This same assumption supposedly accounts  for findings 
of stage-skipping,  a concept which  is inconsistent with developmental 
stage theory,   and   therefore,  does not normally appear   (Kohlberg, 
summer workshop,   1974). 
Differences   in age-group cognitive  levels are apparent  in 
sentence construction and coherence of  ideas.    Many of the seventh 
grade subjects had difficulty  in matching nouns and verbs,  spelling, 
and in other basic areas of writing skills.    From the prototypical 
responses  found  in the present study,   it appears that reasoning and 
the ability to communicate it becomes more sophisticated with age. 
If these intellectual differences are based on inherent cognitive 
ability,   they should  be predictive of moral reasoning differences 
(Kohlberg & Gilligan,   1973). 
Scoring of the objective instrument was done according to the 
following procedure: 
1. Each of the  12 answers or  items were given an individual 
score determined by matching the selected   letter  from A through F 
on the answer  sheet with  the corresponding stage represented by the 
reasoning of  the selected  answer. 
2. Global  scores were computed  in the  same manner as on the 
open-end  instrument,   by ascertaining that  stage which had  the 
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highest percentage of representation among the  total number of responses 
or items. 
3.     Tied  scores were also solved in the same manner as on the open- 
end instrument,  by assigning  the global score to the highest-tied stage. 
The scores of the subjects in each age-group were then analyzed 
to determine differences between the two tests and among the three age- 
groups. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS  AND DISCUSSION 
The present  study was done  to determine whether a valid 
pen and paper  test could be constructed  for measuring stage of 
moral development.     In order  to answer this question,  two dif- 
ferent  tests based  on the original Kohlberg Moral Judgment   Interview, 
were constructed  and given to three different  age groups.    One of 
the tests requested   self-structured responses  in answer  to open- 
ended  questions about moral dilemma situations, while the other 
test requested  selection of one of six preconstructed responses 
representing the six moral developmental  stages,   in answer to the 
same moral dilemma questions.     The subjects were three age-groups 
of seventh-graders,   twelfth-graders,   and  college students who were 
predominantly freshmen and  sophomores.    The responses of each sub- 
ject were scored   in terms of moral  stage.     These data were analyzed 
to see  if either of  the two instruments could differentiate moral 
stages among the  three age-groups.    Because of  the supposed relation 
of moral stages  to cognitive stages,   it was expected that moral stage 
score differences would be found  in seventh-graders and twelfth-graders, 
who were assumed  to be at different cognitive stages of development. 
It was not expected  that college students necessarily would be dif- 
ferentiated  from twelfth-graders because of similarity in age,  and 
supposed  similarity in cognitive functioning. 
75 
Reliability of Scoring Open-End   Instrument 
Reliability of  scoring for  the open-end instrument was accom- 
plished by having a  trained person score blindly a sample of 30 open- 
end  tests,  drawn at  random from the total population of open-end  in- 
struments.     Training of  the independent scorer Involved two,   two.-hour 
sessions in which  the researcher verbally described Kohlberg's moral 
development  stages and reviewed prototypical  statements of each;   one 
two-hour session in which  the  independent scorer blindly scored prac- 
tice protocols in the presence of the researcher,  and  finally,  a one- 
week practice  session on the part of the trained scorer in which she 
blindly scored protocols selected  from the original  sample after the 
random drawing of  30 had  been made.     The Independent  scorer was then 
allowed one week to  score  the 30 unseen questionnaires. 
The data  from both  scorers were analyzed  for agreement  in a 
matched-pair analysis of variance,   a statistic which yields both the 
correlation between scorers and  an indication of whether there is a 
difference between the mean ratings of the  two scorers.    The result- 
ing correlation coefficient was  .75,  and  the F for the difference be- 
tween the means was not significant.    Thus, adequate scoring reli- 
ability can be assumed. 
Validation of  the Open-End   Instrument 
A single classification analysis of the variance was first 
done to measure the differences in the average  stage scores for  the 
three age-groups:     seventh-grade,   twelfth-grade,  and  college freshman 
and sophomore students.     The average stage score for each group was 
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determined   from the dominant   stage score of each subject  in that group. 
The seventh-graders*  mean stage score was 2.43 which indicates  that 
generally,   they were between Stages 2 and  3 in moral development.     The 
mean moral  stage of  twelfth-graders was 3.17,   indicating  that they 
were somewhat  advanced   in Stage 3  thinking.     College  students appeared 
to be slightly ahead  of  twelfth grade subjects with a mean moral  stage 
of 3.26   (See Table   1). 
TABLE  1 
Analysis of the Variance and   t-Tests of Dominant 
Stages  on  the Open-End Test  for Seventh-Grade, 
Twelfth-Grade,   and College Students 
Source 
Between groups 
Within groups 
df 
2 
107 
MS F 
6.66 8.5  (p-C .01) 
.79 
Mean-Stages Scores 
Seventh-grade   (n > 28) 2.43 
Twelfth-grade   (n .  30) 3.17 
College   (n . 50) 3.26 
Grade  7 vs grade   12 
Grade 7 vs college 
Grade  12 vs college 
Differences  between Menus 
-.74* 
-.83* 
-.09 
P   <   .05 
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Results of  the analysis indicated  that there were significant 
differences among  the mean stage scores of the three groups.     In 
order to locate  the  source of  these differences,  multiple t-tests 
were performed,   using  the a_ method  as described by Tukey   (Bruning & 
Kintz,   1968,   p.   112).     In keeping with expected age differences, 
findings  from the t-tests  showed that twelfth-grade  students had 
significantly higher mean scores than seventh-grade students.     College 
students also scored  significantly higher than did  seventh-graders. 
When compared with  twelfth-graders,   college subjects scored somewhat 
higher,  although not  significantly so.     It is not clear  from the 
literature whether college  students should have higher stage scores 
than seniors  in high  school.     The most prominent  study including 
college-age  students was done by Kramer   (Kohlberg & Kramer,   1961), 
who first  identified  a  transition period   in early college students 
and Stage 5 thinking in post-graduate students around age 25.     Current 
Kohlberg researchers claim that postconventional thinking   (Stages 5 
and 6)  is much more rare than previously supposed,   and indeed,   Stage 
6 is so rare that  scoring procedure  for  it is not provided  in the 
most recently revised  scoring guide  for Kohlberg's oral interview 
(Kohlberg,   summer workshop,   1974).    At any rate,  although  the  twelfth- 
grade and college-age samples  in the present  study may have differed 
slightly in composition,   the college subjects perhaps being of a higher 
socio-economic class on the average,   there was  little reason to expect 
much difference in the scores of the two groups because of  their close- 
ness in age. 
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These results  lend  some support for the validity of the open- 
end technique,   in that   they fit  the hypotheses given in the   literature. 
Rest   (1968) and Blatt   (Blatt & Kohlberg,   1973)  used comparable age 
groups and published   the  frequency distributions of the number of sub- 
jects in the different moral developmental stages.     Rest used 47 
twelfth-grade  subjects  from a middle-class suburban Chicago high school; 
Blatt had a more  complicated   study,  but 66 of his subjects  (in Study  II) 
were in the 11-12 year age range, which  is quite close  to the present 
study's subgroup of   12-  and   13-year old   seventh-graders.    However, half 
of Blatt's sample consisted of black,   upper-lower class and   lower-lower 
class subjects;   the other half was made up of white lower-middle class 
and upper-lower  class  subjects.    For this reason,  Blatt's younger 
population sample  is probably a better approximation of the composi- 
tion of the present study's  comparable age-group than Rest's subjects 
are to the high  school  senior group of the present study. 
Table 2  shows  the  frequency distributions and Chi-square analysis 
comparing relevant groups from the present study with Rest's and Blatt  s 
studies.    According  to Kohlberg's   (1963)  earlier frequency distribution, 
Stage 4 thinking would be expected  to predominate in high school 
seniors,   then Stage 3,   Stage 5, Stage  1,  Stage 2,  and Stage 6.     For 
seventh-graders or  13-year-olds, Kohlberg found Stage 4  to predomi- 
nate again,  but  it was followed closely by Stage 3,   then Stage 5,  Stage 
1, Stage 2,  and  Stage 6.     More recent researchers however, claim that 
even Stage 4 is quite difficult to reach by adolescents,   since out of 
1,000 protocols of junior and  senior high school students scored  in 
the last year,  only four or  less than IX of these subjects were judged 
to be functioning  fully at Stage 4   (Kohlberg,   summer workshop,   1974). 
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TABLE 2 
Comparison of Frequency Distributions and Percentages of 
Dominant Stages from Open-End   Instruments 
of Blatt,   Rest,  and  the Present Study 
Moral development   stage Grade 12 Grade 7 College 
Rest 
I     1 
Pres. 
f 
Study 
% 
Blatt    Pres 
111 
.  S. 
1 
Pres. 
f 
Study 
1 
Stage 1 1    02 0 00 17    26      7 25 0 00 
Stage 2 6    14 9 30 29    44      7 25 9 18 
Stage 3 17    40 7 23 15    22      9 32 20 40 
Stage 4 12    30 14 47 5    08      5 18 20 40 
Stage 5 6    14 0 00 0    00      0 00 1 02 
Stage 6 0* 00 0 00 00    00      0 00 0 00 
Total 42 30 66             28 50 
*Note. -Rest had pre-selected  five high stage subjects  for his  sample, but 
they have been removed  from Table 2.    Stages having all zero's were not 
included   in the analyses reported below. 
Chi-Square Analysis 
Present Study grade  12 vs Rest grade 12 
Present Study college vs Rest grade 12 
Present Study grade 7 vs Blatt grade 6 
X* df 
10.2   (p< .05) 4 
6.8 * 
4.5 3 
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The Chi-square results,  for twelfth-graders,   shows the sub- 
jects from the present   study and Rest's groups to be significantly 
different.     Though  the present study has a somewhat greater per- 
centage of subjects at Stage 4 than does Rest,  it has no subjects 
at Stage 5, while 14% of Rest's subjects achieved this 6tage.     In 
addition,  30% of  the present study's subjects fall  in the stage 2 
category   (none being found predominantly at Stage  1), while only 
167, of Rest's group  fall  into the combined categories of Stages 1 
and 2. 
A comparison of  the college group with Rest's high school 
subjects,  however, does not yield a significant Chi-square between 
distributions.     In fact,   the college subjects of the present  study 
achieved   slightly  lower  scores  than Rest's sample of high school 
seniors.     Only 2% of the college students reached Stage 5 for example, 
while 147. of Rest's seniors reached  this stage. 
The Chi-square  for the comparison of  the present study's  11- 
12 year age-group with Blatt's is not significant;   thus,   the dis- 
tributions do not differ. 
Although the evidence is not perfect,   it tends to favor  the 
validity of this open-end approach.     The fact  that Rest studied middle- 
class suburban Chicago adolescents may account,  somewhat,   for the 
higher scores of his subjects over the scores of the comparable age- 
group of the present study, which was a southern urban/rural adoles- 
cent population,  heterogeneous in social class,  race,  and  intellectual 
ability. 
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With  these considerations in mind,   therefore, it might be ex- 
pected  that  the  college subjects would be more similar to Rest's group 
in terms of scores,   since they were likely more similar to Rest's group 
in composition characteristics,   including  social class, which Blatt 
later found  to be associated with differences  in measures of moral 
development   (Blatt & Kohlberg,   1969). 
In the comparison of seventh-grade subjects,  accordingly,   it 
might also be expected  that Blatt's group would be more similar to the 
group in the present   study,   since Blatt  included many lower-class sub- 
jects in his sample;   and,   it will be remembered that no differences 
were found  to exist between these two groups. 
In summary,   the bulk of the evidence approaches original expec- 
tations;   it   indicates  that the open-end  questionnaire agrees with other 
findings ascertained   through Kohlberg's oral  interviewing technique. 
It is important   to note, however,   that of the 80 subjects in the present 
study,  ranging  from the  twelfth-grade up,   including 50 college students, 
only one subject  achieved a score as high as Stage 5, while Rest  found 
that six out of his 42  subjects achieved  this stage.    Aside from the 
difficulty of reaching Stage 5,   and  even Stage 4,  as reported by con- 
temporary Kohlberg investigators,   it  is possible that the open-end 
format requiring a  subject  to write instead of freely verbalizing, 
tends to prevent  achieving  the more abstract,  highest stages.       The 
Kohlberg scorers have  found  that  subjects  tire of writing and do not 
reach as high  a  stage as they might during an oral interview  (Kohlberg, 
summer workshop,   1974).     Present evidence does not answer this ques- 
tion;   further research may be needed  to clarify,  for example, whether 
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a subject's  score may be affected by his avoidance of words he cannot 
spell,   or other hindrances that may be due to the requirement of putting 
explanations of moral reasoning  into written form.     Sentence and word 
complexity were informally measured   in the present study by syllable 
count,  and  it appeared   that complex questions asking for a solution 
to a moral dilemma predicted the selection of a high stage answer. 
Validation of  the Objective   Instrument 
The  first  step  in analyzing  the data obtained  from this ques- 
tionnaire was  identical  to  the process used  in analysis of the open- 
end instrument:     A single  classification analysis of the variance was 
done to measure the difference  in the average  stage scores among the 
three age groups.     Results of this procedure showed   that  there were 
no significant differences between the mean stage scores of the groups 
(See Table 3).     Thus  the major evidence for validity of the objective 
instrument is  lacking. 
TABLE 3 
Analysis of  the Variance and Mean Stage Scores on the 
Objective   Instrument  for Seventh Grade, 
Twelfth Grade, and  College Subjects 
Source ±1 MS F 
Between groups 2 2.67 1.4 
Within groups 107 1.98 
Mean Stages 
Seventh grade 4.41 
Twelfth grade 4.90 
College 4.92 
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All means on the objective test were over 4.0,   or Stage 4, 
which  strongly suggests  that  the  instrument did not discriminate 
between groups because of a "ceiling effect," resulting from the 
large number of subjects  in all groups who achieved high stage 
scores.    The distributions of stages detailed in Table 4 illustrate 
this clearly. 
The basic question is why the scoring    is  so high as to obtain 
a ceiling effect with  the objective instrument.     Rest   (1968) postu- 
lated  two reasons for   subjects'   consistent ranking of high stage answers 
as the most  appropriate  response to dilemma  situations in an objective 
test: 
TABLE 4 
Frequency Distributions and  Percentages of 
Dominant  Stages on Objective   Instrument 
Moral development stage Grade  12 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Stage 3 
Stage 4 
Stage 5 
Stage 6 
Total 
f % 
1 03 
3 10 
0 00 
3 10 
11 35 
13 42 
Grade 7 
31 
f % 
2 7 
1 3 
5 17 
7 24 
3 10 
11 38 
College 
f 1 
0 00 
2 04 
3 06 
1 02 
15 30 
29 58 
29 50 
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1.    Selection of a high-stage response does not necessarily 
indicate   true comprehension of  it;   it may be chosen be- 
cause  it   sounds "better"  or more noble than the other 
answers. 
2.    Seeing the response   in written form,  one is able to 
truly comprehend it,   since the structure of the response 
is already delineated,  and one does not have to form it 
in his mind, "from  scratch." 
The present  study was not designed  to test  either of  these postulations, 
but there is some   indirect  evidence that may shed  some light on the 
plausibility of each. 
Rest   found   in verbalizing situations,   that few subjects could 
comprehend over one moral stage higher  than their dominant stage, 
which was determined  through the Kohlberg Moral Judgment   Interview. 
Therefore,   for each college   subject in the present study,   the highest 
stage reached at   least   twice on the open-end questionnaire was re- 
corded.     (It will be remembered  that the college sample was the only 
one of the  three  groups which was given both tests and  therefore was 
the only group  for which there were matched  scores.)    These stages 
were then paired  with   the dominant  stage the subjects attained on 
the objective test,  and   the differences were tallied.    Subjects whose 
highest  stage on  the open-end  test was Stage 5 or 6 were deleted  from 
the comparison,   since  they could not achieve objective scores more 
than one stage above their own open-end  scores. 
A comparison was made to see how much higher the dominant objec- 
tive test  scores were  than the highest   twice-attained   scores on the 
open-end  instrument.     The  latter  score was subtracted  from the former, 
to get a difference score,  or a plus   <+>  score, which would indicate 
that the objective score was higher  (See Table 5). 
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TABLE  5 
Distribution of Difference Scores between the Highest 
Stage  Reached Twice on the Open-End  Instrument 
and   the Dominant  Stage Reached on the 
Objective   Instrument by 
College Students 
Degree of difference 
-2 stages 
-1 stage 
0 stages 
1 stage 
2 stages 
3 stages 
f 2 
2 4 
3 6 
4 8 
16 32 
21 42 
4 8 
50 
In Rest's study,  only about half of    his subjects could compre- 
hend one  stage above  their dominant  stage as ascertained by Kohlberg's 
interview.     In the present study,  41 out of 50 or 82% of the subjects 
scored at   least one stage higher on the objective test  than the highest 
stap.e reached   twice on the open-end questionnaire. 
Table 5  shows difference  scores of all  subjects.    More important 
to note,  however,   is  that of the 40 subjects who had highest-reached 
scores of  Stage 4 or below,  25 or 63% had a dominant stage score of at 
least two  stages higher on the  objective  instrument.     (The other ten 
subjects had highest-reached  scores of Stage 5,  and  thus could not 
gain more  than one  stage on the objective questionnaire;   of these ten, 
however,  seven did  score one  stage higher. 
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Rest claimed that comprehension, at best, goes only one 
stage higher than the stage of operation which is used spontaneously. 
Thus, it might be argued that since a majority of the subjects in the 
present study scored two or more stages higher on the objective ques- 
tionnaire, it seems less likely that they were actually comprehending 
the objective statements or answers in terms of their moral developmental 
status. 
A more compelling argument,  however,   is based on the  logic imply- 
ing a relationship between a subject's ability to verbalize thinking 
typical of a moral  6tage and his ability to comprehend such thinking 
when presented with  it   in an objective  format.    By analogy,   it would 
be expected  that a person who does well on an open-end test  in some 
school subject would also do well on a multiple-choice or other objec- 
tive test in that  subject area.     This reasoning leads to the speculation 
that  there  should  be a correlation between the highest-reached  stages 
on the open-end   instrument  and  the dominant  stage reached on the objec- 
tive instrument.     In addition,   there should probably be a relationship 
between the dominant  stages reached on both  instruments. 
Neither of the two correlations testing these relationships 
was even suggestive of significance.     The r between highest-reached 
(open-end)   stages and dominant   (objective)   stages was  .07,  and  that 
between dominant  stages on the two instruments was .02.    Thus,  no 
relationship was  found between the  subjects'  ability to verbalize 
and their ability  to comprehend moral thinking. 
It  is suggested  that  some subjects may be truly comprehending 
higher stages on the objective test, but probably many others are 
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choosing the "best" or most abstract answer in order to do well or 
to please the investigator. Using the vocabulary of psychological 
testing,   some subjects may have a response set. 
Whatever   the reasons for the ceiling effect  on the objective 
test   (which  is a researchable question)   it is evident that in its 
present  form,   the instrument  is not distinguishing between different 
age-groups'   levels of moral development.     In comparing the objective 
test with  the open-end  test  across seventh- and twelfth-grade age- 
groups the difference   in scores was significant,   the objective scores 
being consistently higher  than the open-end scores for the same age 
level. 
The ceiling effect resulting from the large numbers of high- 
stage scores on the objective  instrument prevented  it from distin- 
guishing age-groups,   unlike the open-end instrument, which did dis- 
tinguish age-groups in moral development  levels. 
It  is questionable,   therefore, whether the measurement of 
individual   levels of moral development  is feasible or even possible 
with an objective  instrument. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY,   CONCLUSIONS,  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Moral  reasoning was long thought  to be a process of internali- 
zation of cultural rules,  or an overt conforming action, manifested 
in socially sanctioned behaviors and virtues.    More recently,  Kohl- 
berg has postulated   that moral reasoning is developmental in nature, 
paralleling Piagetian cognitive development.     Kohlberg has designed 
an oral  interview technique which yields individual scores of moral 
development  in terms of  functioning moral  stage.     Since moral develop- 
ment has a cognitive basis,  Kohlberg recommends that moral education 
be implemented  in traditional classrooms as a basic "subject"   to be 
taught  to school  students.    However, developmental theory implies 
that  there will be a "problem of the match" which can be solved only 
when the current moral development  stage is known. 
The purpose of this research was to adapt  the time-consuming 
interview to a pen and paper    instrument which could be given to an 
entire group at one  sitting.     Being more convenient and  less time- 
consuming to score,   this instrument would  therefore be an aid  to 
teachers  in promoting development of a higher  level of moral reason- 
ing among their  students. 
Two written instruments were developed by the researcher. 
One was an open-end questionnaire allowing  for self-structured 
responses,  and   the other was an objective, multiple-choice question- 
naire.     Both  instruments were based on Kohlberg's original interview 
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(1958)   and were  identical in construction in terms of moral dilemmas 
provided and questions requiring  solutions  to the situations. 
The alternative choices on the objective  instrument were based 
directly on prototypical responses reported by Kohlberg   (1958) or 
on his definitions of each moral  stage.     Each alternative choice 
represented reasoning characteristic of one of the  six developmental 
moral  stages postulated by Kohlberg. 
Validation of both  instruments was based on the yielding of 
age-group differences  in moral development  scores.     The criterion 
for judging validation was based on Kohlberg's  (1963)  original  find- 
ings,  and on his contention that moral development parallels cognitive 
development,   the  latter of which has been described  in terms of age- 
related  stages   (Piaget,   1952, Ginsburg & Opper,   1969). 
A total of  168  subjects in three age-groups,   seventh-graders, 
twelfth-graders and college subjects were used.    Each of the two 
younger age-groups were sub-divided.     Half the subjects in each age- 
group were given the objective instrument and half were given the 
open-end  instrument.     Each of the college subjects was given both 
instruments;   thus matched pairs of scores on the  two tests were ob- 
tained  for this age-group. 
Analysis of the data showed   that  the open-end instrument dis- 
criminated  the  scores of  seventh-graders and  twelfth-graders, whereas 
the objective  instrument did not discriminate among the different groups 
at all.     Reliability   (r -  .75)  in scoring of  the open-end questionnaire 
was achieved   through comparison of a sample of scores given by the 
researcher with scores given by a trained,   independent  scorer. 
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The objective  instrument appeared   to produce a "ceiling effect" 
resulting  from the consistent  selection of high-stage responses by a 
large majority of subjects  in each age-group. 
No relationship was  found between scores on the two tests in 
the college age-group,   for which there were matched pairs of scores. 
It was suggested,   therefore  that many subjects were not actually com- 
prehending the high-stage responses they were selecting on the objec- 
tive instrument,  but they may have been responding  to "best"-sounding 
answers and  thus orienting  to a response  set early in the answering 
process. 
The possibility of a response set  raises the question of 
whether the measurement of  individual  levels of moral development 
is feasible or even possible with an objective instrument. 
It is recommended that  further exploration of the discriminating 
ability of an objective instrument be pursued,   since an objective instru- 
ment i6 far more efficient  than a complex interviewing process or an 
open-end instrument.     Teachers who are not steeped in the Kohlberg 
theory but who are  interested  in promoting moral development among 
students would be greatly helped by such an instrument. 
Future research  should be oriented  toward  identifying those word6, 
phrases, or  ideas  implied in the alternative choices which may be  lead- 
ing subjects  to orient  to a response set.     It is also suggested that 
the objective instrument be  expanded to provide for pro and  con alter- 
natives for each moral stage,   since Kohlberg contends that structure 
does not necessarily predict content of moral thinking. 
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APPENDIX 
THE  RESEARCH   INSTRUMENTS 
Open-End   Instrument 
This questionnaire is designed to determine how some 
people think about different situations, how they make de- 
cisions,  and   the reasoning behind  their decisions. 
You are asked to write a response to each of the follow- 
ing six problem situations, being certain to state why you feel 
the way you do. 
Please read  the  following directions first: 
1.     Read each situation,   then write in your answer to each 
of the  two questions which   follow each situation. 
Please write your answer  in the space provided,  but  use 
only two or three sentences to answer;   just enough to 
answer  the question and to show why you answered  it 
that way.     In other words,   please write in the reason 
you  feel  the way you do. 
There are six problem  situations with two questions each, 
making a  total of twelve questions  to be answered.     You 
will have fifty minutes  to complete the form;   please pace 
yourself  so  that you can answer each question and complete 
the entire questionnaire. 
3.     This   is a research project;   please be as honest as you 
can.     Please do not discuss  the situations in any way 
with anyone until  the class  is dismissed. 
2. 
Situation  I 
In Europe,  a woman was near death  from a special kind 
There was one drug that  the doctors thought might  save her. 
by a druggist  in the  same town,  who had recently discovered   i 
drug was expensive to make,  but  the druggist was charging 5  t 
it cost  to make  the drug.     He paid $400 for  the raw materials 
charged $2,000 for a small does of the drug.     The sick woman 
Heintz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money,  but he 
get  together about $1,000,  half of what it cost.     He told the 
that his wife was dying,  and asked him to sell it cheaper or 
later.    But  the druggist said,  "No,   I discovered the drug and 
of cancer. 
It was made 
t.    The 
imes what 
and 
s  husband, 
could only 
druggist 
let him pay 
I'm going 
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to make money from it, so I won't let you have it unless you give me 
$2,000 now." So Heintz got desperate and broke into the man's store 
to steal  the drug  for his wife. 
Questi # 1. Should Heintz have broken into the store to steal the 
drug? 
question # 2.     Heintz broke  into the  store to  steal the drug,  and  the 
druggist, who was in a back office, heard   the noise and 
went into the  store with a gun.     He could  not see clearly 
who Heintz was,  but he  started  shooting at him.     Heintz 
was  confused  as to whether to shoot back or just try to 
escape.     What  are your  feelings about this? 
Situation  II 
The drug didn't work,   and  there was no other treatment known to 
medicine which could  save Heintz'  wife.     So the doctor knew that she 
had only about six months  to  live.    She was in terrible pain,  but  she 
was so weak that a good dose of painkiller  like ether or morphine would 
make her die sooner.     She was almost crazy with pain, but in her calm 
periods,   she would  ask the doctor  to give her enough ether  to kill her. 
She said  she couldn't stand  the pain and  she was going to die in a few 
months anyway. 
Question I  3.     Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug 
that will kill her? 
Question # 4.    When a pet dog is badly wounded,   it  is killed to end  its 
pain,  but  it  is against  the  law to end a human life  for 
the  same humanitarian reason.    How do you feel about this? 
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Situation  III 
Heintz'  wife died,  and Heintz went  to jail  for breaking in 
and  stealing the medicine.     He was sentenced  for ten years, but 
after a couple of years,  he escaped  from prison and went to  live 
in another part of  the  country under a new name.     He saved money 
and  slowly built up a big  factory.     He gave his workers the highest 
wages and used most of his profits  to build a hospital  for work in 
curing cancer.     Twenty years had passed when a tailor came  from 
Heintz'  home  town and recognized  the factory owner as being Heintz 
the escaped  convict whom the police had been looking for back in 
his home  town. 
question g 5.     Should  the tailor report Hein tz  to the police? 
Question # 6.     How do you feel about Heintz'   predicament now? 
should he do? 
What 
Situation  IV 
In Korea,  a  company of Marines was way outnumbered and was re- 
treating before  the  enemy.     The company had crossed a bridges over a 
river,  but  the  enemy were mostly still on the other side.     If someone 
went back to the bridge and blew it up as the enemy were coming over 
it,  it would weaken the enemy.    With  the head  start the ""of the 
company would have,   they could probably then escape.    But the man who 
stayed back to blow up  the bridge would probably not be able to escape 
alive;   there would be about 4  to 1 chance he would be killed.    The cap 
tain of the company has  to decide who should go back «*<•*!**; 
The captain himself is the man who knows best how to lead the retreat 
to safety.     He asks   for volunteers,  but no one will volunteer. 
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question # 8.  The captain proposed that they should draw straws, but 
~ some men did not want to do that.  How do you feel about 
it as a solution? 
Situation V 
The captain finally decided  to order one of the men to stay 
behind.     One of   the men he thought of was one who had a   lot of 
strength and  courage but who was a bad  troublemaker.    He was always 
stealing things   from  the other men,  beating them up and wouldn't do 
his  work.     The  second man he thought of had gotten a bad disease  in 
Korea and was  likely  to die in a   few months anyway,   though he was 
strong enough  to blow up the bridge. 
Question # 9.     If the captain was going to send one of the two men, 
should he send  the troublemaker or the sick man? 
Question it   10.     Actually,   it seems that the troublemaker   deserves some 
~~" punishment,   and  the sick man doesn't.    Why should  the 
sick man have to give up his  life to save the  trouble- 
maker?    What  is the  fairest  thing to do? 
Situation VI 
In another country, during  the war  in Europe a city was often 
being bombed  by  the enemy.     So each man was given a post he was  to go 
to right after  the bombing,   to help put out  the fires the bombs  started 
and to rescue people  in the burning buildings.    A man named Diesing was 
made the chief in charge of one fire engine post.    The post was »«r 
where he worked   so he  could  get there quickly during the day butIt WM 
a  long way from his home.     One day there was a very kM7MU« «* 
Diesing   left  the   shelter in the place he worked and went  toward hi.«M 
station.     But when he  saw how much of the city was burning    he got wor 
ried about his family.     So he decided he had  to go home ft see 
his family was  safe,   even though his home was a  long way off and  the 
station was nearby,  and  there was somebody assigned  to protect  the area 
where his family was. 
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question #  11.    Was  It right or wrong  for him to  leave his station to 
protect his  family? 
Question fl  12.     What do you think about the  fairness of the city's plan? 
Objective   Instrument 
Directions. 
1.     Reach  each Situation in the questionnaire,   then the two questions 
which   follow each Situation.    Answer  each question by marking on 
the Answer Sheet   the  letter of the one statement following the 
question with which you most closely agree.    There are  six state- 
ments  following each question from which to choose.     The  state- 
ments are ordered A through F;   please be sure your answer on 
the answer  sheet  is in the form of a printed,   capital  letter, 
2. 
3. 
A, B,   C,  D, E.  or F. Please choose only one answer  for  each 
question. 
Go through  the questionnaire quickly,   reading each Situation 
and  corresponding questions individually.    Answer the questions 
you can,   then go back to  those which need more  thought.     Pace 
yourself so  that  you will have time to complete  the entire 
questionnaire.     There are six Situations,   followed by two 
questions each,   so that you will write twelve answers. 
You will have 50 minutes  to complete the questionnaire.     In- 
dividual questions will be answered before and anytime during 
the marking of the questionnaire. 
Situation I 
In Europe,  a woman was near death from a  special kind of cancer. 
There was one drug  that  the doctors thought might save her.     It W« J 
form of radium  that a druggist  in the same town had recently ^covered. 
The drug was expensive to make,  but the druggist was charging 5  times 
what  it cost him to make  the drug.     He paid $400 for J^'^jEnd 
charged $2,000  for a  small dose of the drug.     The sick -man s h^band 
Heintz, went  to everyone he knew to borrow the «ey "L druggls 
get  together about $1,000,   half of what  it cost      H d the^ruggis 
that his wife was dying,  and asked  him to sell  it cneape 
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pay  later.     But   the druggist  said,  "No,   I discovered  the drug and   I'm 
going to make money from it,   so  I won't  let you have  it unless you give 
me $2,000 now."     So Heintz got desperate and broke into the man*s store 
to steal the drug  for his wife. 
Question #   1.     Should  Heintz have broken into the  store to steal  the 
drug? 
A. If  society does not provide  some  legitimate means  to the drug,   then 
Heintz should not be held responsible for stealing. 
B. Stealing  is  justified because of Heintz*  great and natural concern 
for his wife. 
C. It  is all right  for Heintz  to steal the drug because he needs  it so 
badly. 
D. It would be the right  thing to do,  even if it was a stranger whose 
life was at  stake. 
E. Since Heintz*   life  is more  important  than a drug,   it would be better 
for him to let his wife die than for him to go to jail  for stealing. 
F. Stealing  Is all right  in this situation only if the drug is absolutely 
necessary and   sure  to work,   and  if Heintz sincerely intends to pay it 
back. 
Question » 2.     Heintz decided  to steal the drug and broke into the 
store.     The druggist heard   the noise and went into 
the  store with a gun.     He could not see clearly who 
Heintz was,  but he started   shooting at him.    Heintz 
was confused  as to whether  to  shoot back or just 
try to escape.     What are your  feelings about this? 
A. Heintz should  shoot  back;   it's either his  life or the druggist's. 
B. The druggist   should  have yelled a warning before he started  shooting. 
C. It  is all right   to  shoot someone who is stealing. 
D. The druggist had  a   legal right  to protect his property by shooting. 
E. The druggist  should  not be so greedy;   he  should be nice to Heintz 
who is trying  so hard  to save his wife. 
F. Heintz was forced   to  steal the drug to save "» ««f'» J"e'a^ 
he is justified  in this case to defend himself by shooting back. 
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Situation II 
The drug didn't work,   and  there was no other  treatment known to 
medicine which could  save Heintz1 wife.     So the Dr.   knew that  she had 
only about  six months to  live.     She was in terrible pain,  but  she was 
so weak that a good dose of pain-killer  like ether or morphine would 
make her die sooner.     She was almost crazy with pain,  but  in her calm 
periods,   she would  ask the Dr.   to give her enough ether to kill her. 
She said   she couldn't  stand  the pain and  she was going to die  in a 
few months anyway. 
Question # 3.     Should  the Dr.   do what she asks and give her the drug 
that will make her die? 
A. A  life  full of pain is no good  to anybody and there really is no 
use for her to  live. 
B. It  really  should not be the Dr.'s decision,  because all life is 
of equal value and no one person has  the right  to take a life. 
C. The Dr.   should give her something else  to ease the pain;   it would 
be outright murder if he does as the woman asks. 
D. Although it  is  legally wrong to mercy-kill,   there are other  fac- 
tors in this situation to consider;   the greatest drawback is that 
it could  lead  to  legalized mercy-killing. 
E. Something should be done to relieve the woman's awful  suffering 
and  the agony of her husband, who is watching her die;   still, 
mercy-killing is a horrible thing. 
F. If the  law allowed   it,   the Dr.  maybe should go ahead and do it in 
this  situation.      It's more  like suicide,  really,   and the woman her- 
self should be responsible  for the decision. 
Question # A.    When a pet dog is badly wounded,   it  is killed to end  its 
       pain,  but  it is against the  law to end a human life for 
the same humanitarian reason.    How do you feel about  this? 
A. You don't  love animals in the same way as people;  we would be killing 
off our own  species. 
B. Animals  should not be mercy-killed either. 
C. The best thing to do is to get an agreement with everyone concerned, 
not just  the sick woman, on what should be done. 
D. It is against the  law to mercy-kill a human being. 
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E. If a person wants  to die,  it's his life,  and  the decision should 
be completely up to him. 
F. People have different and deeper  feelings from animals,  and   they 
just  should not be treated  the  same way as animals are  treated. 
Situation  III 
Heintz's wife died,   and Heintz went to jail for breaking in and 
stealing  the medicine.     He was sentenced  for  ten years, but after a 
couple of years,  he escaped   from prison and went to live in another 
part of the country under a new name.     He  saved money and  slowly built 
up a big factory.     He gave his workers the highest wages and used most 
of his profits  to build a hospital  for work in curing cancer.    Twenty 
years had passed when a  tailor came from Heintz's home town and recog- 
nized  the  factory owner as being Heintz  the escaped convict whom the 
police had been  looking for back in his home town. 
Question # 5.     Should  the tailor report Heintz to the police? 
A. The tailor  should not report Heintz because Heintz really doesn't 
need  anymore trouble and  if he  is told on, he may seek revenge. 
B. The tailor  should  try to understand Heintz's actions,  even though 
he broke the  law;   the tailor should not tell. 
C. Although punishment  for Heintz may be  less  if he is reported now, 
the tailor  should consider  the importance of the  factory and the 
need  for Heintz  to run it. 
D. The tailor  should try  to keep a good relationship with both Heintz 
and help the police,   too;   the best thing would be to tell the police 
but try to persuade them to be merciful. 
E. It would not be  fair to report a person who is serving the community 
so well and doing   so much  for everyone else. 
F. It is the tailor's duty to report Heintz,  because he did break the 
law. 
Question # 6.     How do you feel about Heintz's predicament? 
A. Heintz has more  than paid his debt  to society for stealing and 
escaping. 
B. Heintz wasn't all  that bad  in the  first place, and it would be 
better not to make him go  through all that again. 
C. Heintz should definitely be given another chance because he doesn't 
need to  steal anymore. 
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D. Heintz should not expect mercy;   he should be forced to complete 
his prison tern. 
E. Heintz  is not going  to become a criminal now after 20 useful 
years as a good  citizen,  and he should be  left alone. 
F. Heintz  should be corrected fcr  the wrong he did by escaping. 
Situation  IV 
In Korea,  a company of Marines was way outnumbered and was re- 
treating before  the enemy.     The company had  crossed a bridge over a 
river,  but  the enemy were mostly still on the other side.     If someone 
went back to the bridge and blew it up as the enemy were coming over 
it,  it would weaken  the  enemy.    With the head  start the rest of the 
company would  have,   they could probably then escape.    But  the man who 
stayed back to blow up the bridge would probably not be able to escape 
alive;   there would be about 4 to  1 chance he would be killed.    The 
captain of  the company has to decide who should go back and do the 
job.    The captain himself is  the man who knows best how to lead the 
retreat  to safety.     He asks for volunteers,  but no one will volunteer. 
question # 7.     Should   the captain order a man to stay behind at the 
bridge,  or  stay behind himself,  or  leave nobody behind? 
A. The one person who should not go  is the captain, who is more impor- 
tant  than the others for  leading the group,  and he should be spared. 
B. It  is wasteful to risk losing  the whole company;   the best thing for 
everyone  is  for one man to stay behind and do the job. 
C. The captain should order someone to stay behind, but he must be 
responsible  for whatever happens to that person. 
D. The decision should be  to save the greatest number of lives you can, 
because many   lives together are more useful than the one life that 
may be  lost. 
E. Every man for himself;   if  the captain wants to blow up the bridge, 
that's his problem. 
F. A man should   stay behind and blow up the bridge,  and he Will be 
greatly rewarded   for it;   besides doing something good  for his 
country,  he will probably also become a great hero. 
Question » 8.     The captain proposed  that they should draw straws, but 
       some men did  not want  to do that.    How do you feel about 
it as a  solution? 
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A. It's better   than ordering someone to do the job,  although an 
order  is a   sure way to solve the problem. 
B. It  is more  fair to draw straws;   that way no one will have hurt 
feelings. 
C. By drawing   straws,  each man would have as much chance of not 
being picked  as every other man;   and  this way,   the captain 
could not protect his   favorites. 
D. Drawing straws  is not a good  solution if it  leads to not sending 
the best man for the  job. 
E. There is no advantage  to drawing  straws;   it wastes time and just 
causes arguments. 
F. Drawing  straws is  the  only way to respect each man's equal right 
to  live;   there is no singling out except by chance. 
Situation V 
The captain finally decided  to order one of the men to stay 
behind.    One of  the men he  thought of was one who had a  lot of strength 
and  courage but who was a bad  troublemaker.     He was always stealing 
things  from the other men,   beating  them up and wouldn't do his work. 
The second man he   thought of had gotten a bad disease  in Korea and 
was likely to die  in a  few months anyway,   though    he was strong enough 
to blow up  the bridge. 
Question fl 9.     If the captain was going to send one of the two men, 
should he send  the  troublemaker or the sick man? 
A. The captain should   send  either  the troublemaker,  or both men to 
make sure the  job gets done. 
B. It would be better to lose one man than two, since the safety of 
the whole group depends on everyone sticking together; he should 
send  the  sick man. 
C. It would  be doing the  sick man a favor to let him go and  earn his 
reward before  he dies. 
D. If the captain sends the troublemaker in order to punish him, it 
would be  like  sentencing him to death without a  trial. 
E. The troublemaker can still perform his own tasks,  and  in the long 
run,  he will be more useful  to the company since the sick man will 
die.     Besides,   if the troublemaker is  sent, he could dessert,  so 
the sick man should go. 
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F.    The man who doesn't have anything  to lose and nothing much  to live 
for  should go;   probably the sick man,   since life probably has  little 
pleasure left  for him now. 
Question #  10.  Actually,  it  seems that  the troublemaker deserves some 
punishment,   and the sick man doesn't.    Why should  the 
sick man have to give up his  life to save the trouble- 
maker? 
A. He really shouldn't because a  troublemaker is just no good  in a 
group;   they're really better off without him. 
B. The troublemaker   shouldn't be punished because he hasn't been all 
that bad. 
C. The  lives of both men are equal and worth  the same, and  they should 
be  treated  the same. 
D. The troublemaker  should not go because he can make up what he stole. 
E. The captain really should  send  the  troublemaker,  because he  is a 
danger  to everyone and  could kill  somebody. 
F. The  troublemaker  is not  really a criminal and he should not be 
punished as  such. 
Situation VI 
In another country,  during  the war in Europe,  a city was often 
being bombed by  the enemy.     So each man was given a post he was to go 
to right after  the bombing,   to help put out  fires the bombs started 
and to rescue people  in the burning buildings.    A man named Diesing 
was made  the chief in charge of one fire engine post.    The post was 
near where he worked  so he could get there quickly during the day but 
it was a  long way from his home.     One day there was a very heavy bomb- 
ing and Diesing   left  the shelter in the place he worked and went  toward 
his fire  station.     But when he saw how much of the city was burning,  he 
got worried  about his  family.     So he decided  he had  to go home first  to 
see  if his  family was  safe,   even though his home was a long way off and 
the station was nearby,   and   there was somebody assigned to protect the 
area where his  family was. 
Question #   11. Was  it   right or wrong for him to leave his station to 
protect his  family? 
A. Diesing is expected by the government to fulfill his resP°n^bi"^' 
and he should, even though it means putting the welfare of the whole 
city over the welfare of  just his family. 
105 
B. Everyone  should  have equal protection.     If Dlesing deserted his 
post,   there would be no one to help  those near his post;   the 
right  thing to do is  to  stay. 
C. Diesing should   save his  family;  he needs them more  than anyone 
else. 
D. Diesing  should   stay at his post because the government has 
assigned   it  to him,   and he  is  supposed  to obey the government. 
E. Diesing  is  still helping,   no matter which he does,   so he should 
make sure his family  is safe first. 
F. It's Diesing's duty to stay;   if he left,  someone could be killed 
or the whole city destroyed because of him. 
Question tf  12.     What do you think about  the  fairness of the city's plan? 
A. The city is right to  try  to protect as many people as possible, not 
just families. 
B. The city has the plan all worked out and knows what  is best for its 
own people. 
C. The plan should not  allow some men to leave their posts for their 
families while other men have to stay;   it  should be  fair  to every- 
body. 
D. The plan is a  fair one, providing for the protection of as many 
as possible,  and   the men at  the post  should not allow their fears 
for their  families to  interfere with  their responsibilities under 
the plan. 
E. It is a good plan because  there  is no need for a man to dessert 
his post;   each man's   family is being protected by the man at the 
post nearest  the   family. 
F. The plan is really unfair,   because every man should take care of 
his family  first. 
